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THE OBSOLESCENCE OF WALL STREET:
A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO
THE EVOLVING STRUCTURE OF
FEDERAL SECURITIES
REGULATION
Joel Seligman*
This article is dedicated to Professor Al Conard, a wonderful colleague, who after many years as an active emeritus member of the University of Michigan Law School has recently retired to a new home
away from Ann Arbor. Many of us miss him daily, and I offer this
article in the spirit of a Festschrift contribution in his honor.

At its core, the primary policy of the federal securities lawsi involves the remediation of information asymmetries. This is most
obviously true with respect to the mandatory disclosure system,
which compels business corporations and other securities issuers to
disseminate detailed, generally issuer-specific information when
selling new securities to the public and requires specified issuers2 to
file annual and other periodic reports containing the same or simi-

*

Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1971, UCLA; J.D. 1974, Harvard. -

Ed.
1. There are seven federal securities laws: The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a
(1988); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1988); the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1988); the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77aaa (1988); the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1988); the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (1988); and the Securities Investor Protection
Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa (1988). For general descriptions, see 1 Lows Loss & JoEL
SEUGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 226-70 (1989). This article addresses the Securities Act
and the Securities Exchange Act, which are the two federal securities statutes of greatest
enduring significance.
2. The Securities Exchange Act requires annual, quarterly, and, on occasion, monthly
reports to be filed by firms that satisfy specified criteria. Most notably, these firms must have
(i) a security registered on a national securities exchange, see § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a)
(1988); (ii) total assets of $5 million or more and a class of equity security held of record by
500 or more security holders when its securities are not traded on a national securities exchange and are traded in the alternative over-the-counter market, see § 12(g)(l), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78l(g)(l) (1988); Rule 12g-1, 17 c.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1994); or (iii) a security registered
under the Securities Act, unless and until the security is held by fewer than 300 persons, see
§ 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1988). Regarding the categories of issuers required to file
mandatory annual and periodic reports under the Securities Exchange Act, see generally 4
Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 1733-1916.
There are currently about 13,400 issuers that file annual and periodic reports under the
Securities Exchange Act. See Private Litigation under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 341 (1993) (statement of A.A. Sommer, Jr.).
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lar information.3 This system was, in essence, a response to the failure of business and foreign government issuers sufficiently to
disclose information material to investment decisions in the period
preceding the en~ctment of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities
Act) 4 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).s
The remediation of information asymmetries is also a primary
policy objective of the Securities and Exchange Commission's regulation of broker-dealers.6 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) uses a variety of reporting,1 record keeping,s minimum
net capital,9 and inspection10 techniques to deter broker-dealers
from charging securities customers excessive commissions or
"markups" in individual transactions11 and to protect customers
from entrusting their securities or monies to broker-dealers on the
verge of insolvency.12
While the theory and techniques of federal securities regulation
are relatively straightforward, the scope of the mandatory disclosure system and broker-dealer regimens has been fluid over time.
3. The textual content of the. mandatory disclosure system is specified in Regulation S-K,
17 C.F.R. § 229 (1994). The SEC's accounting requirements are detailed in Regulation S-X,
17 C.F.R. § 210 {1994). Regarding both, see generally 2 Loss & SBUOMAN, supra note 1, at
620-743.
4. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48

S~t.

74 {codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77 {1988)).

5. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988)); see
Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CoRP.
L. 1 (1983); see also 1 Loss & SBUOMAN, supra note 1, at 171-229.
6. Section 15{a){l) of the Exchange Act requires registration with the SEC of brokerdealers that "effect any transactions in, or ••• induce or attempt to induce the purchase or
sale of, any security," other than specified exempted securities. § 15(a)(l), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(a)(l) {1988). Regarding the registration requirement, see 6 Loss & SBUOMAN, supra
note 1, at 2965-76. A registered broker-dealer must also be a member of a self-regulatory
organization. This usually means the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) or
a securities exchange. See 6 id. at 2815-16.
7. Broker-dealers are required both to report periodically about the finances of their
firm, see 7 Loss & SBUOMAN, supra note 1, at 3117-28 (describing Rule 17a-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.17a-5 (1994), and Form X-17A-5), and to provide confirmation statements and other
reports to securities customers, see 8 id. at 3803-16 {discussing Rule lOb-10, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.lOb-10 (1994)).
8. See 7 id. at 3107-16.
9. See 7 id. at 3128-57.
10. See 7 id. at 3190-98.
11. Cf. Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 {2d Cir. 1943) ("The essential
objective of securities legislation is to protect those who do not know market conditions from
the overreachings of those who do."), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944).
12. There are other regulations also applicable to broker-dealers, such as the securities
customer insurance scheme established in 1970 by the Securities Investor Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78aaa-78lll (1988), see 7 Loss & SBUOMAN, supra note 1, at 3306-28, and the
prohibitions of fixed brokerage commission rates, see 6 id. at 2831-97.
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Exemptions for intrastate13 and private - rather than public initial sales,14 municipal15 and federal government securities,16 as
well as unanticipated new :financial products11 have limited or expanded the scope of federal securities regulation with increased celerity in recent years.
The immediate future of federal securities regulation is likely to
be devoted in considerable part to the resolution of boundary questions. The reasons for this are less matters of statutory construction
than they are matters of politics and context. In terms of information asymmetries, there is often little practical difference between
financial instruments subject to the federal securities laws and those
that are exempt. In many instances, the exemptions to securities
laws were adopted because of the success of political lobbies such
as those that championed state securities regulation or municipal
issuers.18 Yet, once adopted, laws do not endure eternally because
of inertia. As the factual context against which Congress and the
SEC have acted changes, an ongoing process of law revision continuously occurs.
This article begins in Part I by describing the dynamic elements
in federal securities regulation. These include (i) changes in the investor community, (ii) internationalization of issuers and investors,
(iii) computer technology, and (iv) the maturing of :financial
economics.
Part II illustrates how these dynamics will continue to change
the boundaries of federal securities regulation in three illustrative
13. See Securities Act § 3(a)(ll), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(ll) (1988); 3 Loss & SELIGMAN,
supra note 1, at 1274-1307; see also Exchange Act§ 15(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(l) (1988); 6
Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 3009-12. See generally infra text accompanying notes
112-44 (discussing state securities regulation).
14. Securities Act § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988); 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note l, at
1350-450.
15. Securities Act§ 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1988); Exchange Act§§ 3(a)(12), 15B,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(12), 78o-4 (1988); see also 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 1159-73;
4 id. at 1782-89; 6 id. at 3086-95. See generally infra text accompanying notes 198-215 (discussing municipal securities).
16. Securities Act § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1988); Exchange Act § 3(a)(12), 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1988); Exchange Act § 15C, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5 (1988); see also 3 Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 1158-59; 4 id. at 1782-86; 6 id. at 3095-103.
17. Examples of this phenomenon include variable annuities, which are considered to be
securities despite the exemption for insurance products in Securities Act § 3(a)(8), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(a)(8) (1988), see 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note l, at 1000-20, and employee benefit
plans, many of which are not securities, see 2 id. at 1031-50. More recently, over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives have emerged as a major concern. See infra text accompanying notes 100111.
18. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF TiiE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 65, 187-88
(1982).
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areas: (i) state securities regulation, or so-called blue sky laws; (ii)
the scope of the Securities Act of 1933; and (iii) municipal securities
regulation. Each of these topics illustrates a different type of
boundary problem. First, state securities regulation was intended to
be concurrent with federal securities law. But its initial raison d'etre
- regulating the merits of new securities offerings - has increasingly been called into question because of the growing significance
of international securities trading. Second, the scope of the Securities Act of 1933 has recently been effectively narrowed because of
· congressional and SEC initiatives in response to competitive international securities markets and the growth of institutional investors.
Here, however, matters are more complicated than they may seem
at first. 19 In part, what may appear to be a significant reduction of a
mandatory disclosure regime may involve instead a substitution of
ongoing obligations, implied by :financial economics theory. Finally,
the logic of the exemption for new securities issuances by municipalities has dissipated over time, at least for certain categories of
municipal securities as they have come more closely to resemble
corporate issuances.20
When these boundary questions are viewed jointly, three basic
themes emerge:
First, the remediation of information asymmetries endures as a
policy justification for important aspects of federal securities regulation. But the need for a mandatory disclosure system varies significantly from context to context and is not static over time.
Second, there are coordination and "level playing field" advantages to subjecting like firms and :financial products to a single regulator. But the probability of this logical outcome occurring is highly
dependent on political factors.
Third, the single factor most likely to change fundamentally the
scope of securities regulation in the foreseeable future is internationalization. Increasingly, U.S. securities markets are being inte19. In a recent article in the Duke Law Journal, Second Circuit Judge and fonner Yale
law professor Ralph K. Wmter expressed the view that the federal securities laws registration
and periodic disclosure provisions "will die of their own accord because they are inefficient
enough that they deter foreign companies from choosing to register their stock in this country." Ralph K. Wmter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers:
Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 947 n.7 {1993). This, as I elaborate
infra at text accompanying notes 146-97, appears, at most, to be only partially correct.
20. Similarly, in 1993, Congress requested a study of whether regulation of government
securities dealers should continue to be subject to joint SEC-'Ifeasury oversight or, like SEC
broker-dealer regulation, should solely involve the SEC as the federal government's regulator. Government Securities Act Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-202, § 112, 107 Stat.
2344, 2354 {1993).
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grated into world trading markets. This may portend the evolution
of a new type of federalism in which national securities regulation is
"local" and international regulation is the equivalent to national
regulation today. But this outcome seems unlikely to occur for a
considerable period of time. The vast preponderance of U.S. securities are unlikely to be of much interest to international investors.
More importantly, significant differences between the U.S. investor
community and. those abroad would make it highly difficult to integrate regulatory regimes without considerable sacrifice of the primary techniques for protecting noninstitutional investors in the
United States.
As a matter of analytical style, this article illustrates a contextualist approach. For a considerable period of time, the dominant analytical style in corporate and securities .law has been a variant of
economic, or law and economics, analysis. The virtue of this type of
analysis is that it focuses on what its authors deem to be crucial
variables and reaches conclusions derived from the core of a specific legal problem. The defect of this type of analysis is that so
much is assumed or often assumed away.
In contrast, the contextualist approach attempts a more ambitious description of the legal - meaning statutory, rule, and agency
interpretation - historical, and empirical framework of specific
problems. The defect of this type of approach is that when a problem is accurately set against its full context, analysis is less likely to
reach simple, far-reaching conclusions. This is also the virtue of
contextual analysis. To put matters directly, the world of corporate
and securities law is often a more complicated, more slowly evolving one than the law and economics theorists would have us believe.
While there is great value in economic analysis in this and many
other fields, this value is best appreciated against a broader historical and empirical framework than some of its votaries have
provided.

I.

THE OBSOLESCENCE OF

wALL STREET

Formally, many aspects of securities trading before the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 are familiar. To define security in terms such as "any note,
stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture. "21 is to employ a contemporary vocabulary. Similarly, the mechanisms of securities trading 21. Securities Act § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b{l) {1988); Exchange Act § 3{a){10), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c{a)(10) (1988).
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the underwriter,22 broker,23 dealer,24 or securities exchange25 - are
denoted in these sixty-year-old laws in terms that, while sometimes
vague, are easily parsed by today's readers.
But the factual context in which securities trading occurred
before the New Deal's enactment of the federal securities laws is
much less familiar. It was a simpler world. In 1930 the United
States had a population of approximately 123 million,26 of whom
approximately 1.5 million - or 1.2% - had securities accounts.21
Institutional investment was in its infancy. In the years 1926-1929,
investment companies - the best known of which today is the mutual fund - increased their total assets to over $8 billion,28 an
amount equal to less than ten percent of the New York Stock Exchange's $89.7 billion valuation on September 1, 1929.29 Nonetheless, the innovation of buying a portfolio of securities, rather than
individual stocks, made the investment trust, in the mellifluous
judgment of John Kenneth Galbraith, " 'the most notable piece of
speculative architecture of the late twenties, and the one by which,
more than any other device, the public demand for common stocks
was satisfied.' "30 Public demand, it cannot be overemphasized, was
limited to just over one percent of the overall population.
The period before the New Deal's adoption of the federal securities laws also witnessed the first significant, and distinctly unsatisfactory, experience of public investment in foreign securities.
Between 1923 and 1930, American investors purchased close to $6.3
billion of foreign bonds.3 1 Then, in rapid order, the collapse of the
world economy led to substantial depreciation of over ninety percent of all foreign bonds sold in the United States. By December
1931, the aggregate market price for fourteen Latin-American na22. See Securities Act § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(ll) (1988).
23. See Exchange Act § 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1988).
24. See Exchange Act § 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1988).
25. See Exchange Act § 3(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(l) (1988).
26. WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 377 (1995).
27. This figure refers to the number of accounts in 1929. See S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1934).
28. SEUGMAN, supra note 18, at 222.
29. S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 27, at 7.
30. SEUGMAN, supra note 18, at 222 (quoting JOHN KENNETH GALBRAinl, THE GREAT
CRAsH 51 (1955)). The Senate's Stock Exchange Practices Report was less gracious, writing
in 1934: "A veritable epidemic of investment trusts afflicted the Nation." S. REP. No. 1455,
supra note 27, at 339.
31. S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 27, at 89. This equaled approximately ten percent of
new security sales in the United States during those years. 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 1006 (1975).
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tions' bonds was twenty-six percent of their· face value. Peruvian
bonds were selling at less than seven percent of their par value.32
Before the 1930s, Wall Street had already experienced technological revolutions. The nineteenth century had witnessed the arrival of the telegraph, the telephone, and the stock quotation ticker,
which made it possible for securities broker-dealers outside New
York City to be aware of last sale prices on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) floor and to place orders on a timely basis.33
Similarly, before the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was enacted,
securities were often traded in broker-dealer offices in an over-thecounter market "unified only by 'a nationwide web of telephone
and telegraph wires.' "34 Nonetheless, to modem eyes, the trading
mechanisms of the· early 1930s were quite primitive. Stock quotations in the over-the-counter market, for example, were published
only once a day in National Quotation Bureau publications, with
popular names such as the "pink sheets," which listed buy and sell
quotations for each securities dealer in each stock at the close of the
previous trading day.35 This guaranteed that these quotes were
stale on the day that they were used. The pink sheets were, in fact,
more a telephone directory than a quotation service. Even the august NYSE did not appear to be much more technologically advanced. To execute a trade, a floor broker had to pick up an order
from an off-the-floor trading booth and walk the order to the middle of the floor for execution by a reciprocal floor broker or specialist - a "marketmaker." The floor broker would then scribble
down the details of the transaction on an order ticket, exchange
tickets with the reciprocal floor broker or specialist, and walk the
completed order ticket off the floor.36 Much of this human intermediation was capable of automation.
Underlying stock trading at that time were theories of securities
analysis that in retrospect appear similarly simple. The leading
published work in the field, Graham and Dodd's Security Analysis, 37 included the premise:
32. Sale of Foreign Bonds or Securities in the United States: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Fin., 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 324-27 (1931) (statement of Hon. Fiorello H.
LaGuardia); 75 CONG. REc. 6057 (1932); Henry Grattan Doyle, Investors' Losses in South
America, 35 CURRENT Hisr. 720, 721 (1932).
33. ROBERT SOBEL, INSIDE WALL STREET 30-33 (1977).
34. SEUGMAN, supra note 18, at 141.
35. 5 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 2579.
36. 5 id. at 2508-09.
37. Benjamin Graham & David L. Dodd's Security Analysis: Principles and Technique
was initially published in 1934. I quote BENJAMIN GRAHAM ET AL., SECURITY ANALYSIS:
PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUE (4th ed. 1962).
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The most important single factor determining a stock's value is now
held to be the indicated average feture earning power, i.e., the estimated average earnings for a future span of years. Intrinsic value
would then be found by first forecasting this earning power and then
multiplying that prediction by an appropriate "capitalization
factor. "38
This type of analysis has long been familiar to students of corporate

law as a valuation technique employed in the appraisal or calculation of fair market value for dissenting shareholders in mergers and
other fundamental transactions.39 This technique is, as Graham and
Dodd candidly acknowledged, "not an exact science,"40 involving
estimates of both past average earnings power and multipliers or
capitalization rates. Calculation of a multiplier could be particularly subjective.41 As one critic was quoted as saying in 1977,
"[S]uch a valuation is usually 'a guess compounded by an estimate.' "42 Nonetheless, the Graham and Dodd valuation technique
provided intellectual support for the proposition that shrewd investment analysts could outtrade most of the market by careful study of
a corporation's financial statements and other relevant records.
Graham and Dodd's work also strengthened the hand of those who
urged that stock acquisition and sale was an investment process, not
a matter of speculation or gambling.4 3
Financial innovation during this period was also primitive. In
the 1934 version of their work, Graham and Dodd essentially examined just four types of securities: bonds, preferred stock, common stock, and stock option warrants.44 Warrants had only been
38. GRAHAM ET AL, supra note 37, at 28.
39. See Joel Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV, 829,
851-54 (1984).
40. GRAHAM ET AL, supra note 37, at 24.
41. Delaware courts long selected multipliers in reliance on A.S. Dewing's historical data
in his two-volume treatise, A.S. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL PouCY OF CORPORATIONS (5th
ed. 1953). See, e.g., Levin v. Midland-Ross Corp., 194 A.2d 50, 57 (Del. Ch. 1963). By the
mid-1960s, Delaware ceased to rely on Dewing. See, e.g., David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill
Intl., Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 433-34 (Del. Ch. 1968); Swanton v. State Guar. Corp., 215 A.2d 242,
244-46 (Del. Ch. 1965).
42. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 222 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6181 (quoting Peter Coogan).
43. In that day, these were crucial distinctions. In 1937, SEC Chairman (later Supreme
Court Justice) William 0. Douglas stung the NYSE by analogizing exchanges to "private
clubs" and noting of the NYSE short sale regulations in particular: "In a market in which
there is such an enormous public interest ••• it is essential that no element of the casino be
allowed to intrude •..." SEuGMAN, supra note 18, at 163 (quoting WILUAM 0. DouoLAs,
DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 70 (1940)). In part because the NYSE felt vulnerable to such
charges, it soon reorganized.
44. GRAHAM ET AL, supra note 37, at 620-26.
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authorized for Delaware corporations in March 1929.45 To a considerable extent, the world of corporate finance before the New
Deal was dominated by three types of securities. The Stock Exchange Practices Report of 1934 reported: "As of July 31, 1933,
there were listed on [thirty-four organized] exchanges 6,057 common and preferred stock issues with a total market value of
$95,051,876,295; and 3,798 bond issues with a total market value of
$49,080,819,993. "46
In essence this was Wall Street: a securities trading market for a
very small percentage of the population, dominated by natural persons rather than institutional investors, and featuring domestic securities, human trading intermediation, primitive financial
economics, and relatively few types of securities.
This simple structure has long been obsolete. To appreciate the
extent to which the underlying factual context of federal securities
regulation has changed, let me separately treat the most significant
contextual elements.
A. Changes in the Investor Community
It is now a commonplace understanding that institutional investors - most notably public and private pension plans, mutual funds
and other investment companies, bank trust departments, and insurance companies - own slightly over one-half of the United
States' equities47 and are now responsible for approximately sixty
45. SEUGMAN, supra note 18, at 43-44.
46. S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 27, at 5.
47. The increase in institutional investor ownership has been slow but steady during the
60-year period after the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
In 1940, for example, an SEC study made for the Temporary National Economic Committee {TNEC) and covering the period through 1937 found that of the seven million separate
holdings of common stock in its list of the SEC's 200 largest nonfinancial corporations, 88%
were of 100 shares or less - strongly suggestive of low institutional investment. TEMPORARY NATL. ECONOMIC CoMM., MONOGRAPH No. 29, DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE
200 LARGEST NoNFINANCIAL CoRPORATIONs 30 (1940).
Between 1955 and 1980, the NYSE estimated that holdings of its listed stocks by selected
institutional investors - insurance companies, investment companies, noninsured pension
funds, foreign institutions, nonprofit institutions, common trust funds, and mutual savings
banks - grew from 15% to 35.4%. NEW YORK STOCK EXCH., FACT BOOK 55 (1985).
In November 1988, a study prepared for the Columbia University School of Law Institutional Investor Project, in consultation with the New York Stock Exchange, updated data
concerning institutional investment. CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO & PATRICK A. GAUGHAN,
CoLUMBIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAw, THE INSTITUTIONAL INvEsroR PRomcr, THE
GRowm: OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN U.S. CAPITAL MARKErs (Nov. 1988). The study
calculated that as of 1987, five categories of institutional investors held total assets of $4,644.4
billion, with pension funds holding $2,018.8 billion (or 43.5% of the total institutional investor assets); investment companies, $790.4 billion (17%); insurance companies, $1,011.2 billion
(21.8%); bank trusts, $693.4 billion (14.9%); and foundations and endowments, $130.6 billion
(2.8% ). Id. at 7. As of 1986, institutional investors had equity holdings of $1,327.2 billion, or
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to eighty percent of public tracling on the New York Stock Exchange.48 As long ago as 1980, 133 million persons indirectly
owned stock through institutional intermediaries.49
The implications of this increased rate of institutional trading
are profound. Between 1962 and 1993, the average size of a trade
grew from 204 to 1441 shares, with "block,, trading - usually
trades of 10,000 shares or more - accounting for 53.7% of reported volume in 1993.50
At the same time, the unfixing of stock brokerage commission
rates on the NYSE in 1975 significantly furthered an earlier process
of reducing the transaction costs of institutional investor equity
trades.51 The Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms,
popularly known as the Brady Report, estimated that between
April 1975, just before the unfixing of commission rates, and 1986,
commissions paid by institutions dropped from 26 to 7.5 cents per
share.52 Lower transaction costs contributed to the stimulation of
an enormous surge in reported share volume. Between 1975 and
1993, the arinual reported volume on the NYSE increased from
approximately 42.7% of total equities. Id. at 13. A later update to the project estimated that
by 1990, institutional investors accounted for 53.3% of public and private outstanding equity.
COLUMBIA SCHOOL OF LAW, THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PRoracr, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CAPITAL MARKErs: 1991 UPDATE 8 (1991). Institutional equity holdings in the
largest 100 corporations as of that date were slightly higher at 54.8%. Id. at 16.
Similarly, as of the end of the first quarter in 1992, an official of the Securities Industry
Association calculated, on the basis of Federal Reserve Board data, that institutions held
54.2% of the $4.96 trillion market value of outstanding stock. Institutions Hold Dominant
Stake in Equities Market, Fed Board Data Show, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 943
(July 9, 1993).
48. See NEW YoRK STOCK EXCH., FAcr BooK 56 (1985).
Data covering the. period from May to December of 1985 found that institutional investors accounted for 61.1 % of NYSE publicly traded stock, with retail customers accounting for
38.9%. BRANCATO & GAUGHAN, supra note 47, at 16. Institutional investor participation
rates are lower in other markets. The same study estimated that they accounted for approximately 30-35% of the trades on the American Stock Exchange (Amex) and specifically
18.9% of the OTC market for the period January through June 1988. Id. at 15.
These data ignore proprietary trading by stock exchange members. When proprietary
trading is thrown into the scales, the percentage of trading by both institutional investors and
other retail customers declines. For example, in October 1987, the Securities Industry Association estimated that institutions accounted for 39% of purchases on the NYSE; proprietary
traders, 27%; retail - meaning natural persons who were not proprietary traders - 34%.
DIVISION op Micr. REG., SEC, THE OcroBER 1987 MARKET BREAK 2-8 n.26 (1988).
49. NEw YoRK SToCK ExCH., SHAREOWNERSlilP 1980, at 1 (1981).
50. NEW YoRK STOCK ExCH., FAcr BooK 17, 100 (1994). In 1988, the average size of
trade reached an annual high of 2303 shares per trade. Id. at 100.
51. See generally 6 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 2831-97.
52. REPORT OF THE PREsIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS 11-15 (1988)
[hereinafter BRADY REPORT].
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4,693.4 to 67,461 billion shares,53 or an increase in average daily
volume from 18.55 to 264.52 million shares.54
While institutional ownership has increased spectacularly in the
post-New Deal period, this trend is less important than the far more
dramatic increase in individual ownership of U.S. securities. It was
understood, even before the enactment of the Securities Act of
1933, that institutional investors did not need the mandatory disclosure system of that Act to protect themselves when acquiring securities.ss These investors could "fend for themselves."56
Between 1929and1990, the number of U.S. investors increased
over thirty-fold, from 1.5 to 51.44 million, and the proportion of the
U.S. population owning stock rose from 1.2% to 21.1 %.57 Equally
significant is the fact that the vast majority of these investors appears to hold relatively modest portfolios. In 1990, the average size
equity portfolio was $11,400; 34.5% of individual shareholders had
portfolios valued at less than $5,000.58 These data are consistent
with the further fact that the 1990 median income of adult shareholders was $43,800, not notably higher than the $32,000 median
53. Cf. NEW YoRK STOCK ExOL, FACT BooK
FACT BOOK 73 (1988).

102 (1994}; NEW YORK STOCK ExOL,

54. NEW YORK STOCK EXCH., FACT BOOK 101 (1994).
55. As James Landis, one of the drafters of the Securities Act, wrote in a reminiscence:
· The sale of an issue of securities to insurance companies or to a limited group of experienced investors, was certainly not a matter of concern to the federal government. That
bureaucracy, untrained in these matters as it was, could hardly equal these investors for
sophistication, provided only it was their own money that they were spending.
James Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
29, 37 (1959).
56. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
57. Regarding 1929 datum, see supra note 27 and accompanying text. The NYSE has
periodically published studies of shareownership. 1\vo of these studies report the following
data on shareholders as a percent of the population:
Millions of
Shareholders as
Year
shareholders
percent of population
1952
1956
1959
1962
1965
1970
1975
1980
1981
1983
1985
1990

6.49
"8.63
12.49
17.01
20.12
30.85
25.27
30.20
32.26
42.36
47.04
51.44

4.2
5.2
7.1
9.2
10.4
15.1
11.9
135
14.4
18.5
20.1
21.l
NEW YoRK SroCK ExOL, SHAREOWNERSHIP 1985, at 3 (1986); NEW YoRK STOCK EXCH.,
SHAREOWNERSHIP 1990, at 10 (1991).
58. The NYSE further elaborated:
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income for the adult U.S. population in that year.s9 A NYSE study
further elaborated: "While the average number of stocks in the
mid-1990 median portfolio was 3.2 ... most shareholders engaged
in little buying and selling activity. For the year mid-1989 to mid1990, three out of five investors had one transaction or less; only
14.9% had six transactions or more."60
These data suggest that a considerably greater number of unsophisticated individual investors trade today than did so in the early
1930s. What is notable about individual investor trading activity is
the extent to which it has diversified in the recent past, apparently
largely in response to tax considerations. An exhibit to the SEC's
Market 2000 study illustrates:
Allocation of Household Liguid Financial Assets
(not including pension fund reserves)61

Liquid Fmancial Assets (Billions)
Bank Deposits and CDs
Equities
U.S. Govt. Securities
Mutual Fund Shares
Muni Bonds
MM Funds
Corporate Bonds

1970

1980

1992

$1,453
37.4%
47.0%
6.9%
3.1%
3.2%

$3,115
48.6%
35.7%
7.7%
1.7%
3.3%
2.1%
1.0%

$8,164
35.4%
31.1%
11.0%
8.0%
7.3%
5.7%
1.6%

2.3%

Nonetheless, when "risk-free" or near "risk-free" investments
are removed from this chart, the enduring significance of equities,
generally the riskiest type of security, is evident.
Stock Portfolio Size of Individual Shareowners
Size

% of Total

Under
$5,000
34.5%
$5,000 - $9,999
12.8%
$10,000 - $24,999
20.9%
$25,000 - $49,999
11.8%
$50,000 - $99,000
9.6%
$100,000 and over
10.4%
NEW YORK STOCK EXCH., SHAREOWNERSHIP 1990, at 19 {1991).
59. Id. at 18.

60. Id. at 19.
61. This information is taken from DIVISION OF Mlcr. REo., SEC, MARKET 2000: AN
EXAMINATION OF CuRRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS ex. 2 {1994) [hereinafter
MARKET 2000].
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Allocation of Household Liquid Financial Assets
(not including pension fund res~rves, bank deposits and CDs,
U.S. Government securities, and MM funds)
Equities
Mutual Fund Shares
Muni Bonds
Corporate Bonds

1970

1992

845%
5.6%
5.8%
4.1%

67.0%
17.2%
15.8%
3.4%

B. Internationalization

A second principal factor in transforming the factual context of
federal securities regulation is internationalization. In 1987, U.S.
investors purchased and sold $187 billion of foreign stocks, while
foreign investors purchased and sold $481.5 billion of U.S. stocks.62
In contrast, as recently as 1975, U.S. investors purchased and sold a
mere $3.3 billion of foreign stock; in that year foreign investors
purchased and sold over $26 billion of U.S. stock.63
A variety of mechanisms facilitated this rapid increase in crossborder trading activity. By October 1987, it was estimated that approximately 800 foreign equities were traded on the London International Stock Exchange, of which approximately 200 were actively
traded. 64 An increasing number of both U.S. and overseas brokerage firms are foreign controlled. In 1986, for example, the General
Accounting Office {GAO) estimated that 30 of the approximately
600 NYSE members were foreign controlled.65
Cross-border stock investment is further facilitated by significantly improved computer and telecommunications technology. As
the Brady Report stated in January 1988, "The communications
networks of four key data providers alone cover over 100,000 equi62. Offshore Offers & Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6779, 41 SEC Docket (CCH)
126, 131 (June 10, 1988).
63. SECURITIES & EXCH. CoMM., STAFF REPORT ON lNTERNATIONAUZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETs II-73 (1987) [hereinafter REPORT ON lNTERNATIONAUZATION].
In 1994, the SEC staff reported that approximately 17 million shares in U.S. securities
were traded in after-hours or off-share trading each day. MARKET 2000, supra note 61, at
VII-1. Approximately seven million of these shares were "faxed" abroad for execution
outside of the United States each day. After-hours trading in the United States, in contrast,
involves foreign investors forwarding orders in U.S. securities to U.S. securities markets for
execution after the nonnal trading hours. Id. at VII-5 to VII-9.
Neither the "fax market" nor the initial steps toward 24-hour-a-day trading has yet had a
significant impact on U.S. securities trading.
64. Robert Aderhold et al., International Linkages among Equities Markets and the October 1987 Market Break, 13 FED. REsERVE BANK N.Y. Q. REv. 34, 37 (Summer 1988).
65. GAO, SECURITIES AND FuruREs: How nm MARKETs DEVELOPED AND How THEY
ARE REGULATED 17 (1986).
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ties, connect over 110 exchanges and include 300,000 terminals in
over 110 countries."66 Still in an incipient phase are stock marketto-market international linkages.67 These mechanisms have increasingly made it possible to shift funds from country to country in
order to take advantage of changes in national corporate price-toearnings ratios, interest rate levels, currency exchange rates, and
other fundamental factors. 68
Concomitant with the increased levels of cross-border equity investment has been a significant decline in the overall share of U.S.
stock markets, measured in terms of capitalization. Between 1978
and 1986, U.S. stock markets declined from 51.6% to 42.6% of
world stock market capitalization. During these same years, Japan,
the second-ranked nation by stock market capitalization, increased
from 19.4% to 29.1 %.69 These data are not particularly stable. In
1989, the U.S. stock markets were responsible for 30.1 % of world
capitalization; Japan was the leader with 37.7%.1°
If the present trend toward internationalization of the securities
markets continues, it ultimately will become commonplace for securities to be distributed simultaneously in the United States and
abroad.
What is most striking at the current time, however, is the
number of fundamental differences in regulatory approach that exist between the United States and other nations with sophisticated
66. BRADY REPORT, supra note 52, at 9-10. "Reuters has developed an Integrated Digital Network known as Equities 2000 that provides real-time prices on more than 100,000
stocks, bonds, mutual funds, futures and options traded on more than 137 exchanges worldwide." Joseph A. Grundfest, International Cooperation in Securities Enforcement: A New
United States Initiative, Address at King's College, London, England 10 (Nov. 9, 1988).
67. See 5 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 2567-70.
68. See, e.g., BRADY REPORT, supra note 52, at I (discussing market activity in the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Japan from 1982-87).
69. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAUZATION, supra note 63, at 11-12.
70. MARKET 2000, supra note 61, ex. 6. This exhibit generalized:
Global Equity Markets Capitalization
(In Billions of Dollars)
1989
Country
1992
United States
3,506
4,758
Japan
2,399
4,393'
United Kingdom
827
839
Germany
365
346
France
365
351
291
Canada
243
Italy
169
115
9,916
9,051
G-7 Nations
1,725
All Other Nations
2,046
WORLD
11,641
11,097
Id.
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securities markets. A 1985 SEC staff study, for example, compared
the distribution systems and statutory and regulatory requirements
of the United Kingdom and certain provinces of Canada with those
in the United States for foreign issuers registering securities with
the SEC on the then-most-basic form for foreign issuers, Form F-

1.71
The staff survey found several material differences: First, Canada and the United States were reported to have similar securities
distribution or underwriting methods. At that time, neither the
United Kingdom nor Canada generally provided for "shelf registration."72 Underwriting methods in the United Kingdom were strikingly different from those used in the United States and Canada.73
Second, substantial differences existed among the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States with respect to required disclosure relating to the nature and character of the issuer, its business,
and its management.74
Third, basic differences existed among the United Kingdom,
Canada, and the United States in each jurisdiction's generally accepted accounting principles and in the requirements to reconcile
financial statements of foreign issuers.1s
Fourth, comparatively, the United States had the most comprehensive liability provision concerning the sale of securities.16
71. Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-6568,
32 SEC Docket (CCH) 707, 709-11(Feb.28, 1985).
72. Id. at 709. Shelf registration allows an issuer of securities to complete the formalities
of staff review of a registration statement and then to place securities "on the shelf," from
where, in a relatively short period of time, they can be taken down and sold to the public.
Because shelf registration gives an issuer greater control over when an issue will be sold to
the public, it has proven very popular. See infra text accompanying notes 160-72.
73. 32 SEC Docket (CCH) at 709-10.
74. As noted in the SEC's 1985 Release,
[A]ll three countries require disclosure of the nature of the issuer's business. In the
United States, Regulation S-K provides specific guidelines as to what should be disclosed. In the United Kingdom and Canada, however, only a general instruction is given
(e.g., describe the issuer's business) without providing further guidance as to the specific
facts which may be material to an understanding of the issuer's business (e.g., backlog of
customer orders or sources and availability of raw materials). Other notable differences
among the jurisdictions surveyed include, but are not limited to: · variations in the requirements for Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations; disclosure of industry segment data; and disclosure of management's
business experience, remuneration, and its beneficial ownership of securities of the
issuer.
Id. at 710.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 710-11. To date, the SEC has achieved only limited success in encouraging
multijurisdictional issuances with its adoption in 1991 of a multijurisdictional disclosure system, limited to the United States and Canada. See Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modification to the Current Registration and Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, Securities Act
Release No. 33-6902, 49 SEC Docket (CCH) 260 (June 21, 1991).
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Finally, somewhat later in 1992, SEC Chairman Richard
Breeden called attention to what were then unbridgeable differences between the United States and other nations that were members of the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO) in minimum capital required of broker-dealers.77
To some extent, these types of differences are inevitable. The
United States has a larger number - and a larger percentage - of
individual investors than any other nation. Its securities law requirements are generally more demanding because of the weaker
ability of individual investors to bargain for the type of information
that in the United States is mandatorily disclosed.
At the same time, however, as other national securities markets
evolve, the ability of the SEC or Congress to insist on our securities
regulatory requirements has lessened. It is not inevitable either
that U.S. or foreign issuers sell securities in the United States or
that U.S. investors buy here. Ultimately, the trend toward internationalization of securities transactions may pose a type of "Robson's choice" for U.S. securities regulation: either there will be an
insistence on maintenance of traditional standards to protect individual investors, with the risk that U.S. securities issuers will increasingly sell abroad and foreign issuers will not sell here, or there
will be a lessening of the stringency of U.S. mandatory requirements with greater risks for individual investors. But this type of
choice so far has resulted in only limited significant changes in the
mandatory disclosure system.78 It is as yet uncertain whether foreign issuers will generally comply with the more demanding U.S.
disclosure requirements to secure access to our markets or whether
the United States will need to sacrifice standards to ensure that securities trading will remain here.
77. In a letter of October 21, 1992, SEC Chairman Breeden discussed deficiencies in the
"building block" approach to capital adequacy used by IOSCO:
Speaking from the point of view of the [SEC), we have come to the conclusion that
the building block approach will not yield sufficient levels of capital to protect markets
in the face of major disruptions. At its most extreme, the approach currently under
consideration would allow capital levels of 2 percent for highly liquid equities that are
part of a diversified portfolio and are offset by unrelated equities on the opposite side.
The SEC rule would require capital equal to 15 percent of long positions plus 30 percent
of the excess of short positions over 25 percent of long positions. The SEC is not prepared to accept 2 percent, and other members have made clear that they will not accept
15 percent
SEC Letter to IOSCO on Capital Adequacy, 5 ImL SEC. REo. REP., Nov. 3, 1992, at 11, 11.
The IOSCO subsequently abandoned its efforts to reach a compromise on this issue. IOSCO
Panel Drops Compromise Effort Regarding Global Capital Standards, 25 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 216 (Feb. 12, 1993). See generally Nancy Worth, Harmonizing Capital Adequacy
Rules for International Banks and Securities Firms, 18 N.C. J. INTL. L. & CoM. REo. 133
(1992).
78. See infra text accompanying notes 146-97.
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C. Computerization
Much of the recent history of the stock markets involves the
transition from manual to computer transactions.79 This transition
became a matter of regulatory concern in the late 1960s, when
nearly two hundred broker-dealer firms that were members of the
NYSE experienced difficulties with clearance and settlement - or
"back office" - operations as a result of a volume surge from 4.89
million shares per day in 1964 to 14.9 million shares in December
1968, aggravated by often self-defeating efforts to engage in "instant computerization" of back offices.so In the early 1970s, overthe-counter trading was revolutionized by the replacement of the
daily pink sheets with the NASDAQ electronic system, which permits brokers to read up-to-the-minute marketmakers' quotations
from desk top terminals.81 Other computer information systems
such as Autex and Instinet permit institutional investors to communicate directly - off the exchange floor - their interest in buying
or selling blocks of securities.sz
Computers have also performed a significant role in order execution. Several exchanges, led by the NYSE, use telecommunications to forward orders to specialists, replacing manual transmission
by floor brokers.83 The Intermarket Trading System (ITS) similarly
links several stock exchanges and the NASD.84 More elaborate
proposals to create a national market system with system-wide
computerized order execution have thus far not been realized,85
although a largely unsuccessful experiment with computerized order execution has been conducted on the Cincinnati Stock Exchange since the late 1970s.s6
In recent years, the computer has performed an increasingly significant role in order origination. Index arbitrage87 would not be
79. See Lewis D. Solomon & Louise Corso, The Impact of Technology on the Trading of
Securities: The Emerging Global Market and the Implications for Regulation, 24 J. MARSHALL L. RE.v. 299 (1991).
80. See SEUGMAN, supra note 18, at 450-66.
81. 5 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 2580-84; SEUGMAN, supra note 18, at 353, 49095.
82. For further discussion of Autex and Instinet, see 5 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at
2577-78.
83. See 5 id. at 2554-64 (discussing several order execution systems).
84. For a discussion of the background of ITS, see 5 id. at 2564-67.
85. See SEUGMAN, supra note 18, at 524-25, 531-34.
86. For a discussion of the Cincinnati Stock Exchange, see 5 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra
note 1, at 2562-64.
87. Index arbitrage exploits the price differences between a stock index future, such as
the S&P 500, and the composite value of the underlying stocks. 5 id. at 2648.
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possible without computers to identify spreads between futures and
the cash market. Portfolio insurance88 uses computers to generate
orders employing technical trading rules. Today, computers can
print order tickets, submit orders, clear transactions, and maintain
records virtually simultaneously. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan is hardly alone in observing that "[t]he speed of information flow together with institutionalization of equity holdings imply that new information can very promptly induce a heavy
imbalance of orders on one side or the other of the market."89

D. Financial Economics
It is by now a thrice-told tale that investment management has
been transformed by modem :financial economics.90 In the simplest
sense, the combination of the efficient market hypothesis,91 warts
88.
"Portfolio insurance" is a term that refers to a number of dynamic hedging strategies to
limit losses in a stock market during a market decline. A typical program might attempt
to ensure a minimum of 95 percent of a current portfolio's value. When a market index
such as the S&P 500 declines to a trigger point, a computer might generate an order to
sell S&P 500 stock index futures as a technique to ensure against further declines. Port·
folio insurance is not free. The SEC Staff reported that the cost of maintenance of a
minimum of 95% of a current portfolio's value 'was estimated to be potentially underperforming a rising market by two to four percent.' DIVISION OF MKT. REG., SEC,
THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK 1-3 {1988). But if an institution is willing to pay
that price, it can participate in any market advance (net of the cost of the stock index
futures) and 'insure' a portfolio against broad market declines.
5 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 2650-52.
89. The Conclusions and Recommendations of the President's "Working Group on Financial Markets": Hearing before Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, lOOth
Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1988) {statement of Chairman Alan Greenspan); see also D1vrs10N OF
Micr. REG., SEC, THE RoLE OF INDEX-RELATED TRADING IN THE MARKET DECUNB OF
SEPTEMBER 11 AND 12, 1986, at 20 (Mar. 1987).
90. For illustrative accounts of this saga, see PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS! THE
IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MODERN WALL STREET {1992); JAMES H. LoRIB BT AL, THE
STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1985); BURTON G. MALKIBL, A RANDOM wALK DOWN WALL STREET (5th ed. 1990). For a leading academic work, see RICHARD
A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CoRPORATB FINANCE {4th ed. 1991).
91. A market in which prices generally reflect available information is called "efficient."
To the extent that securities prices "instantly" or rapidly adjust to new information, the opportunities for investors to outtrade the market is eliminated or reduced. It is generally be·
lieved that at least the most actively traded securities are traded in informationally efficient
markets because of such mechanisms as computerized quotation and information systems
and competition among financial analysts and brokerage house research departments. See,
e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 10 VA.
L. REV. 549 (1984).
The SEC explicitly relied on the efficient market hypothesis in adopting its integrated
disclosure system, as well as Rule 415, its "shelf registration" rule. See, e.g., Shelf Registra·
tion, Securities Act Release No. 33-6499, 29 SEC Docket (CCH} 169, 171-77 (Nov. 29, 1983}.
Sinlilarly, the Supreme Court implicitly deferred to the hypothesis in securities fraud litiga·
tion when it held that the element of reliance in cases involving Exchange Act § lO(b}, 15
U.S.C. § 77j(b} (1988), could be presumed by dint of the concept of fraud on the market,
which holds that market prices reflect publicly available information, including credible false
information. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-49 (1988).
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and all, 92 and portfolio theory93 have generally triumphed in defeat92. The efficient market hypothesis does not prove that securities are correctly priced.
As one federal district court aptly put it:
,
[F]air market price ••. may unfortunately and inaccurately suggest that application of
the fraud-on-the-market theory requires proof that the market correctly reflects some
"fundamental value" of the security. To apply the fraud-on-the-market theory, it is sufficient that the market for a security be "efficient" only in the sense that market prices
reflect the available information about the security.
In re Verifone Sec. Litig., 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1478-79 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1992) {citations omitted),
affd., 11 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 1993).
Commentators have raised other, ofteri quite substantial, concerns about the efficient
market hypothesis. These include the following:
(i) The Efficiency Paradox: As Grossman and Stiglitz urge, a perfectly efficient market is
impossible because securities analysts and other market professionals cannot be expected to
gather information beyond the point at which they can earn a positive return. Hence the
norm should be an "equilibrium level of disequilibrium," in which securities prices reflect
new information rapidly, but not' so quickly that market professionals cannot earn a positive
return. See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally
Efficient Markets, 70 AM. EcoN. REv. 393 {1980). Professor Jensen also makes this point: A
market is efficient when prices reflect information to the point where the marginal benefits of
acting on information - the profits to be made - do not exceed the marginal costs. See
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1575 {1991) {discussing
Jensen's efficiency hypothesis and citing Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. EcoN. 95, 96-W {1978)).
(ii) Noise Theory: As articulated in a much-cited article by Andrei Shleifer and
Lawrence Summers:
Our approach rests on two assumptions. Fust, some investors are not fully rational and
their demand for risky assets is .affected by their beliefs or sentiments that are not fully
justified by fundamental news. Second, arbitrage - defined as trading by fully rational
investors not subject to such sentiment - is risky and therefore limited. The two assumptions together imply that changes in investor sentiment are not fully countered by
arbitragers and so affect security returns. We argue that this approach to financial markets is in many ways superior to the efficient market paradigm.
Our case for the noise trader approach is threefold. First, theoretical models with
limited arbitrage are both tractable and more plausible than models with perfect arbitrage. The efficient market hypothesis obtains only as an extreme case of perfect riskless
arbitrage that is unlikely to apply in practice. Second, the investor sentiment/limited
arbitrage approach yields a more accurate description of financial markets than the efficient markets paradigm. The approach not only explains the available anomalies, but
also readily explains broad features of financial markets such as trading volume and
actual investment strategies. Third, and most importantly, this approach yields new and
testable implications about asset prices, some of which have been proved to be consistent with the data. It is absolutely not true that introducing a degree of irrationality of
some investors into models of financial markets "eliminates all discipline and can explain
anything."
Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, J. EcoN.
l'ERsPECTIVES, Spring 1990, at 19, 20. For the work of an earlier noise theorist who focused
extensively on excess price volatility, see ROBERT J. SHILLER, MARKET VoLATIUTY (1989).
For the work of a legal scholar who posits that once we assume heterogenous investor beliefs,
we have broken the link between stock market price efficiency and the fundamental value of
a firm, see Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair
Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE LJ. 1235, 1245-48, 1286-88, 1292-95 {1990).
{iii) The Joint Hypothesis Testing Problem: Professor Langevoort has urged that "[i]n the
1980s, using more sophisticated data sets and computer technology, a number of economists
began to question the accuracy of the tests that were thought to validate the efficiency
model," to the point where "theorists began seriously to question whether the efficient market model could ever really be validated or discredited." Donald C. Langevoort, Theories,
Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L REv. 851,
853-54 (1992); see also Thomas Lee Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Investment Theory: Implications for Securities Market Regulation and for Corporate Law, 70
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ing the earlier, quite popular belief that shrewd investors could
"outtrade the market" by careful study of fundamental economic
data.
One practical consequence of modem financial economics has
been to change the emphasis of investment advice. Because, at
N.C. L REv. 137 (1991); cf. Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41 DuKE LJ. 977 (1992).

Professor Fama celebrated the twentieth anniversary of his initial literature survey on the
efficient market hypothesis with a new resume of the by-then "thornier" literature. See
Fama, supra. He emphatically defended the theory:
Ambiguity about information and trading costs is not, however, the main obstacle to
inferences about market efficiency. The joint-hypothesis problem is more serious. Thus,
market efficiency per se is not testable. It must be tested jointly with some model of
equilibrium, an asset-pricing model. This point, the theme of the 1970 review, says that
we can only test whether information is properly reflected in prices in the context of a
pricing model that defines the meaning of "properly." As a result, when we find anomalous evidence on the behavior of returns, the way it should be split between market
inefficiency or a bad model of market equilibrium is ambiguous.
Does the fact that market efficiency must be tested jointly with an equilibriumpricing model make empirical research on efficiency uninteresting? Does the jointhypothesis problem make empirical work on asset-pricing models uninteresting? These
are, after all, symmetric questions, with the same answer. My answer is an unequivocal
no. The empirical literature on efficiency and asset-pricing models passes the acid test of
scientific usefulness. It has changed our views about the behavior of returns, across securities and through time. Indeed, academics largely agree on the facts that emerge
from the tests, even when they disagree about their implications for efficiency. The empirical work on market efficiency and asset-pricing models has also changed the views
and practices of market professionals.
Id. at 1575-76 (citation omitted).
Less sanguine is Fischer Black, who has argued that a reasonable definition of an efficient
market is "one in which price is within a factor of 2 of value, i.e., the price is more than half
of value and less than twice value." Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 533 (1986).
93. Portfolio theory divides the risk of each portfolio of securities into alpha risk nonmarket or firm-specific risk - and beta risk - sensitivity of the portfolio to movements
of an overall market Because virtually all of a portfolio's alpha risk can be diversified away,
modem portfolio management has long focused on what degree of beta or market risk is
appropriate. For example, a high-risk or "performance" portfolio might move 15% each
time the market as a whole moves 10%, thus having a beta of 1.5, while a low-risk portfolio
might move 75% and have a beta of .75.
In effect, portfolio theory transforms the logic of investment analysis. Rather than studying individual securities for bargains, the focus is on calculation of risk levels. In a period in
which a securities market rises, the assembling of a high-beta portfolio offers one technique
by which you can outtrade the market
The leading work on this theory has long been WILUAM F. SHARPE, POR1FOUO THEORY
AND CAPITAL MARKETS (1970). Portfolio theory depends upon the accurate prediction of
beta. Historical stock price data are obviously of value in making beta predictions. But there
is controversy as to whether such predictions are likely to be as accurate as beta predictions
based both on stock price data and on fundamental information about the specific securities
held in a portfolio. See Barr Rosenberg & James Guy, Prediction of Beta from Investment
Fundamentals: Part One, FIN. ANALYsrs J., May-June 1976, at 60 [hereinafter Rosenberg &
Guy, Part One]; Barr Rosenberg & James Guy, Prediction of Beta from Investment Fundamentals: Part 1Wo, FIN. ANALYSI'S J., July-Aug. 1976, at 62 [hereinafter Rosenberg & Guy,
Part 1Wo. Rosenberg and Guy have argued that "[b]ecause the portfolio revision decision
entails the sale of specific securities within the portfolio and the purchase of others, it becomes necessary to predict the betas of individual securities." Rosenberg & Guy, Part One,
supra, at 69. Barr Rosenberg and Vmay Marathe's studies of firm "fundamental variables •••
were substantially better predictors (of risk) than the historical beta in the sense that they
achieved a smaller measurement error.'' Rosenberg & Guy, Part 1Wo, supra, at 68.
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least in theory, it is no longer possible to outtrade the market, there
have evolved a wide variety of techniques for risk management.
For individual investors, this has stimulated a gradual increase in
mutual funds rather than in individual equities.94 For institutional
investors this has triggered interest in, among other techniques,
overseas investment to achieve international diversification,9s and
portfolio insurance to hedge against portfolio price declines.96
What is most intriguing about the recent past, however, is the
extent to which :financial risk management has more generally permeated corporate :finance. During the past two decades, two
strands of this development have been most evident. The first such
strand, "securitization," involves the transformation of illiquid debt
into securities.97 Through 1991, over $900 billion in government
and private mortgages had been "securitized" and offered to investors through various forms of "structured :financings. "98 For banks
and other traditional mortgage lenders, mortgage-backed securities
offer significant opportunities for risk reduction. Their assets are
now more liquid, or easily resalable, and their loan portfolios can
be more fully diversified in terms of geography or loan categories.99
Second has been the growing use by non:financial business corporations of derivative :financial instruments to hedge risk. There are
three general categories of derivatives: futures, options, and swaps.
94. See supra text and chart accompanying note 61. Between 1970 and 1992, mutual
funds increased from 3.1 % to 8.0% of household liquid financial assets; during the same
period, individual investment in equities declined from 47% to 31.l %. Id.
95. See supra text accompanying note 62.
96. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. In 1993, program trading techniques averaged 11.9% of the trading volume on the NYSE. MARKET 2000, supra note 61, ex. 23. Portfolio insurance apparently accounted for well over half of that total. See id. exs. 26-27.
97. See generally TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET POOLS, AND AssET-BACKED SECURITIES (1991).
98. 1 FRANKEL, supra note 97, at 39; cf. Exclusion from the Definition of Investment
Company for Certain Structured Financings, Investment Co. Act of 1940, Release No. IC18736, 51 SEC Docket (CCH) 940, 942 (May 29, 1992) ("Structured financings backed by
residential mortgages dominate the structured finance market; in 1991, publicly offered
mortgage-backed securities issuances in the United States totalled approximately $246.21 billion, or eighty-four percent of the structured finance market.").
99. There are other advantages. As Professor Frankel has generalized:
Securitization also enables the holder of loans to raise funds at a lower cost than had
it borrowed on its own credit. Some loans may have a higher credit rating than the
credit of the holder, and investors will demand lower returns for securities backed by
such loans. Opportunities for profit have mobilized the securities industry to develop
securitization techniques. Legal requirements, such as capital requirements, induced
banks to sell their assets, reduce their short-term liabilities, and thereby increase their
equity and long-term debt. Thus, for holders of loans, securitization can lower the cost
of funding, and for banks, it can also reduce the costs of legally required capital.
1 FRANKEL, supra note 97, at 40.
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The initial type of derivative was the agricultural futures contract. In traditional agricultural markets, a futures contract provided for the future delivery of a specified quantity of a particular
commodity on a specified delivery date, using prices suggested by
the current price. Thus a farmer might enter into a futures contract
to sell a stated quantity of wheat due to be harvested in a distant
month, using a current price. This protects the farmer against a
price drop, while at the same time depriving the farmer of an additional profit if wheat prices should rise. Similarly, a grain merchant
or a speculator might enter into a contract to buy a stated quantity
of wheat in the same distant month, using a current price. The
grain merchant, like the farmer, might attempt to hedge against future price rises while conceding the ability to buy at a lower price if
wheat prices fall. 100 More recently, active futures markets have
been established for such :financial futures as foreign currencies,
government securities, and stock indexes.101
Trading in individual stock options predates the SEC. Initially
options were typically called "puts" and "calls":
A put is an option to sell at a certain price within a certain period, and
a call is a similar option to buy. The economic raison d'etre of these
options is to serve as a hedge (a form of insurance) against future
market movements. For example, a person who [owns stock might]
buy a put as insurance that he will be able to sell if the market falls to
a certain level . . . .102
Until 1973, these instruments were generally written in bearer form

by more-or-less professional investors, endorsed by stock exchange
houses, and then bought and sold in the over-the-counter
market.103
Trading in securities options underwent a radical change after
the creation of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) in
1973, soon followed by options trading on the American, Philadelphia, and Pacific Stock Exchanges, with the New York Stock Ex100. The speculator, in contrast, might simply be gambling that he or she can better predict future price movements than the current market price does. Regarding futures, see generally 5 Lo5s & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 2634-52.
101. See generally 1 PHruP McBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COMMODITIES
REGULATION § 1.01 (2d ed. 1989).
102. 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 1066. See generally 2 id. at 1064-72; 5 id. at
2602-34.
103. Almost all of this trading was done in New York by some 20 members of the Put and
Call Brokers and Dealers Association, a purely voluntary association that adopted rules for
the conduct of the business and that polices the affairs of its members. See Vandervelde v.
Put & Call Brokers & Dealers Assn., 344 F. Supp. 118, 125-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (antitrust
action); DIVISION OF TRADING & ExCHS., SEC, REPORT ON PUT AND CALL OPTIONS (1961).
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change joining the fray in 1982.104 The CBOE pioneered two
concepts: "(1) contract standardization so that options were made
fungible by fixing the exercise months and exercise ("striking")
prices, and (2) establishment (and now joint ownership by all the
options exchanges) of The Options Clearing Corporation (OCC),
which is the issuer as well as the guarantor of the traded
options. " 105
Currently there are four basic types of listed options traded by
options exchanges: stock options, stock index options, debt options, and foreign currency options.106 Futures and options are federally regulated respectively by the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) and the SEC. Financial swaps, in contrast, are
not.107
Professor Hu has explained interest rate and currency swaps:·
In its most basic form, an interest rate swap involves: (1) one
party (typically called the "fixed rate payor") agreeing to make periodic payments to the other party which are fixed in amount in return
for {b) the other party (typically called the "floating rate payor" or
the "variable rate payor") agreeing to make periodic payments to the
first party that vary with the "prime rate," "LIBOR," or some other
benchmark of market interest rates. The payments exchanged by the
parties are analogous to interest payments on a purely hypothetical
principal amount (typically called "notional principal amount" or
"notional amount"). No payments analogous to principal payments
are made.

With interest rate swaps, the parties never make any paymentS of
principal. The only payments made can be characterized as de facto
interest payments on a purely hypothetical principal amount. With
the currency swap, however, there are exchanges of both interest and
principal. By carefully structuring these exchanges, parties can hedge
against both currency and interest rate fluctuations. The currency
swap also may offer arbitrage possibilities. If a company has a comparative advantage in the fixed interest rate Deutsche mark capital
market but prefers floating rate United States dollars, it could reduce
its borrowing costs through a currency swap. The company can borrow in the fixed rate Deutsche mark capital market and then, through
a currency swap, transform the fixed rate Deutsche marks to floating
104. See Exchange Act Releases Nos. 19125-19134, 26 SEC Docket (CCH) 464, 464-92
(Oct. 14, 1982) .
105. 2 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 1067-68 (citations omitted).
106. See 5 id. at 2602-34.
107. See generally Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457 (1993)
[hereinafter Hu, Derivatives]; Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modem Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 333 (1989) [hereinafter Hu, Swaps].
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rate United States dollars. Obtaining such funds indirectly can be
cheaper than doing so directly.1os

Swaps are largely outside the scope of existing securities and
futures regulation. But the April 1994 announcement by Procter &
Gamble that it would take a $102 million loss on a complex swap109
reenforced earlier concerns about the solvency risks of the banks
that are the principal dealers in swap transactions.110 By August
1994, a total loss of as much as $6.4 billion in derivatives was reported in the popular press.111

E. Conclusion
In fine, the context of securities regulation is progressively more
rapidly changing. Each of these factors works simultaneously meaning, for example, that a change in computer technology can
rapidly inspire changes in financial products and international order
origination. Against this background, the current boundaries of
federal securities law are often called into question.
108. Hu, Swaps, supra note 107, at 347, 353 (citations omitted).
109. Kelley Holland et al., A Black Hole in the Balance Sheet, Bus. WK., May 16, 1994, at
80.
110. See, e.g., OCC Banking Circular 277, Risk Management of F'mancial Derivatives, 5
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 'I 58,717 (Oct 27, 1993); Group _of Thirty Report Recommends
Methods to Manage Derivatives Activity, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1042, 1043 (July 30,
1993).
In the United States, Congressman Leach published a 900-page report on financial derivatives, including several recommendations. The CFfC has independently recommended an
interagency council to study over-the-counter derivatives further. Gonzalez Bill Would Force
Banks to Disclose More Derivatives Data, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 544 (Apr. 15, 1994);
Levitt Tells House Banking Panel SEC ls Seeking Data on Hedge Funds, 26 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 539 (Apr. 15, 1994); Rep. Leach's Derivatives Study Cal/J for More Regulation
and Accountability, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1608 (Dec. 3, 1993); Rep. Leach Introduces Derivatives Bill for All Financial Institutions, End-Users, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 168 (Feb. 4, 1994}; see also Thomas L. Friedman, Soros Gives House Panel Hedge
Fund Lesson, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 14, 1994, at Cl.
In 1994, the SEC, the CFfC, and the British Securities & Investment Board issued a joint
statement on OTC Derivatives Oversight Statement of the Securities Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and the Securities and Investments
Board, Intl. Series, Release No. IS-642, 56 SEC Docket (CCH) 759 (Mar. 15, 1994). The
statement identified the following joint concerns: (i) exchanges of information, (ii) netting
arrangements, (iii) capital standards, (iv) management controls, (v) customer protection, (vi)
multilateral credit risk management arrangements, and (vii) accounting standards. Subsequently, the F'mancial Accounting Standards Board (FASB} also issued an exposure draft.
FASB Issues Proposed Statement Requiring More Derivative Disclosure, 26 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA} 602 (Apr. 22, 1994).
111. Randall Smith & Steven Lipin, Beleaguered Giant: As Derivatives Losses Rise, Industry Fights To Avert Regulation, WAIL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1994, at Al. See generally COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING CoMMN., OTC DERIVATIVE MARKETs AND THEIR REGULATION
(1993); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: AcnoNS NEEDED TO
PROTECT TiiE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (1994).
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lssUES

A. State Securities Regulation
[In 19il,] the failure of lax state corporation statutes to prevent securities fraud gave rise to the first significant legislative response when
Kansas enacted the first well-known state securities law, popularly
known as a "blue sky" law, since it was intended to check stock swindlers so barefaced they "would sell building lots in the blue sky."112

By its terms, the Kansas statute provided that no investment
company could sell securities in Kansas until it filed a description of
its operations with the bank commissioner and received a permit.
The bank commissioner was given broad discretion not to grant a
permit if he found any aspect of a company's business to be "unfair,
unjust, inequitable or oppressive to any class of contributors, or if
he decides from his examination of its affairs that said investment
company is not solvent and does not intend to do a fair and honest
business, and in his judgment does not promise a fair return on the
stocks, bonds or other securities by it offered for sale."113
This type of statute is popularly known today as "merit regulation" because it vests an administrator with the ability to block the
marketing of a security when he finds it to be "unfair, unjust, inequitable, or oppressive." After the Kansas-type blue sky law was
held constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1917,114 the blue
sky movement swept the country. By 1933, every state except Nevada had a securities law in effect.11s
Rarely have statutes enacted with such fanfare and general support subsequently been so universally deprecated. In the brutal
glare that followed the 1929-1932 stock market crash, it was apparent to virtually all commentators and congressional witnesses on
the subject that the blue sky laws never really had a chance to succeed. As early as 1915, the Investment Bankers Association reported to its members that they could "ignore" all blue sky laws by
112. SEUGMAN, supra note 18, at 44-45; see also Lams Loss & EDWARD M. CoWETr,
(1958); MICHAELE. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW
DEAL 5-7 (1970); cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws,
70 TEXAS L. REv. 347 (1991) (questioning the initial need for blue sky statutes).
113. Act of Mar. 10, 1911, ch. 133, 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 210, 212, repealed by Act of Mar.
16, 1929, ch. 140, 1929 Kan. Sess. Laws 212.
114. See Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917) (upholding Michigan's blue
sky law); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 {1917) (upholding South
Dakota's blue sky law); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 {1917) (upholding the constitutionality of an Ohio blue sky law similar to that of Kansas).
115. 1 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note l, at 39. Today all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guant, and Puerto Rico have blue sky laws in force. The individual statutes are reproduced by state in Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) {1992).
BLUE SKY LAW 7-10
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making offerings across state lines through the mails.116 Unscrupulous securities promoters soon adopted the technique. A 1933 Department of Commerce study found, "The most effective and
widely used method of evading the provision of State blue sky laws
consists in operating across State lines."111 Robert E. Healy, chief
counsel to the Federal Trade Commission, testified before Congress
that same year that over ninety percent of the securities sold in
Pennsylvania were sold through the mails.118
Nor were purely intrastate securities sales much better policed.
Effective lobbying, principally by the Investment Bankers Association (IBA), had riddled ·most state blue sky laws with
exemptions.119
Typically, an-act'might exempt the securities of all corporations listed
on a stock exchange and all securities issued by a public utility subject
to the regulation of a federal or state agency. The more porous statutes also exempted the securities of all firms incorporated intrastate,
bank corporations, insurance companies, investment companies, cooperative associations, building and loan associations, [and] business
trusts, as well as issues "guaranteed by friendly foreign governments,"
mortgage bonds and notes secured by property within the state, shortterm commercial paper, "isolated" securities transactions, one-year
debentures, and a myriad of other types of securities or
transactions.120
Only eight states appropriated sufficient funds to support securities commissions that could work full time investigating suspected
frauds and prosecuting violators. In forty states, administration of the
blue sky act was a "football of politics" as the chairman of the Conference on Prevention of Fraudulent Transactions in Securities put it in
1931. Enforcement responsibilities were assigned to unspecialized attorneys working for state officials as disparate as the railroad commission or the state auditor. When political administrations changed,
responsibility for blue sky enforcement frequently was also
reassigned.121
116.
117.

PARRISH,

supra note 112, at 29.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, A STUDY OF nm ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPBCI'S OF
nm PROPOSED FEDERAL SECURITIES Acr, reprinted in Federal Securities Act: Hearings on

H.lt 4314 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
110 (1933) [hereinafter Federal Securities Act Hearings].
118. Federal Securities Act Hearings, supra note 117, at 228 (testimony of Robert E.
Healy).
119. VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INvEsTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 165-73
(1970) (describing the formation and purpose of the IBA); PARRISH, supra note 112, at 21-28.
120. SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 45-46 (footnote omitted); see also Federal Securities Act
Hearings, supra note 117, at 96; FORREST BEE ASHBY, THE ECONOMIC EFFECT OF BLUE SKY
LAws 46-47 (1926).
121. SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 46; see also ASHBY, supra note 120, at 43-45; HOMER V.
Cmm.RINGTON, THE INvEsToR AND nm SECURITIES Acr 56 (1942); PARRISH, supra note
112, at 28-29.
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Even in New York, wlµch was widely regarded as having the most
effective blue sky agency, enforcement was inadequate. In 1932, the
attorney general's Bureau of Securities employed more than a hundred [individuals,] secured injunctions against 1522 persons and firms,
and instituted 146 criminal prosecutions. At approximately the same
time, officials of the New York Stock Exchange estimated that of the
billion dollars or so of fraudulent securities annually sold in the
United States, about half were sold in New York State.122

After Congress enacted federal securities laws, primarily in 1933
and 1934, the intriguing question is why did the blue sky laws endure? In my view, there are three general reasons.
First, political sentiment favored retention of a state role. The
SEC legislation specifically preserved the blue sky laws. Far from
preempting a field when interstate commerce is involved, Congress
in this case affirmatively yielded to local regulation by inserting a
number of intrastate exemptions even when the mails or facilities of
interstate commerce are used123 and more broadly adopted provisions generally "preserving the jurisdiction of the state securities
commissions."124
The states' enthusiasm for these laws can in part be traced to the
fact that blue sky laws, like corporation statutes, are implicitly tax
statutes: "A 1984 study of reports from thirty state jurisdictions illustrate[d] that in many jurisdictions blue sky laws [were] primarily
revenue measures." 125 In twenty-six of these jurisdictions, revenues, largely from registration statement :filings, exceeded expenses.
In three of these jurisdictions - Nebraska, South Dakota, and Vermont - rev~nues were greater than ten times blue sky expenses; in
six other jurisdictions - Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, and Texas - revenues were at least five times expenses. In
twenty-two of the thirty reporting jurisdictions, blue sky revenues
were at least twice blue sky expenses.126
Second, the state statutes have generally been rewritten to reduce compliance burdens at the state level when a securities issu122. SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 46. Compare Federal Securities Act Hearings, supra
note 117, at 166 (testimony of William Breed) with C!iERruNGTON, supra note 121, at 52.
123. See 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 1274-1307 (discussing the § 3(a)(ll) exemption from the Securities Act of 1933). Nonetheless, commentators periodically have recommended total federal preemption of state securities laws. See, e.g., Rutherford B.
Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10 J. CoRP. L. 553
(1985); see also Camey v. Hanson Oil Co., 690 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1985).
124. 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 272. For a discussion of the provisions in the
relevant statutes, see id. at 271-77.
125. 1 id. at 149-50 (citing North American Securities Administrators Association
(NASAA)). See generally 1 id. at 149-51.
126. The following data were supplied by the NASAA:
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ance is registered at the federal level. Today, over forty state
jurisdictions authorize registration by coordination.121 Most of
these jurisdictions follow the coordination procedure specified in
section 303 of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956128 and limit this
procedure to issuers that have filed a registration statement employing the Securities Act of 1933. In essence, 'the coordination
procedure requires filing at the state level of copies of the registration statement filed with the SEC. If specified conditions are met,
the registration statement automatically becomes effective at the
state level at the moment the federal registration statement becomes effective.129
Revenues
Expenses
Total no.
Attorneys
State
(in OOOs)
(in OOOs)
employees
CPAs
Ala.
$ 1,668.
$ 663.
1
23
Cal.
9,139.
7,000.
42
161
Conn.
2,280
891.
4
31
Del.
377
112.
1
3
Fla.
3,730.
738.
24
15
Ga.
1,819.
748.
22
5
Idaho
799.
152.
3
8
Ill.
5,481.
776.
8
30
Iowa
1,590
335.
13
7
Kan.
918.
485.
13
3
1
Ky.
1,434.
540.
15
N.A.
Mass.
1,236.
N.A.
18
1
Minn.
4,309.
542.
15
1
Mont
1,589.
229.
9
3
Neb.
2,219.
213.
11
0
Nev.
872.
N.A.
3
1
6
N.D.
855.
180.
17
Ohio
5,485.
2,729.
58
13
30
Okla.
2,469.
904.
12
7
Or.
1,445.
413.
13
Pa.
3,101.
1,684.
50
1
11
P.R.
120.
186.
1
S.D.
1,443.
129.
6
24
6
Tenn.
2,102.
N.A.
19
Tex.
10,651.
2,133.
67
5
12
Utah
963.
350.
1
2
Vt
545.
54.
N.A.
20
Va.
583.
762.
7
9
Wash.
4,192.
873.
1
6
Wyo.
553.
188.
1 id. at 150. In this table, "N.A." means Not Ascertainable.
See also Mark A. Sargent, Blue Sky Law: Regulation of Investment Companies Sources of the Current Controversy, 13 SEC. REo. LI. 167, 172 n.24 (1985) (estimating that in
another state, Missouri, fees paid by investment companies alone were ten times blue sky
expenses).
127. See 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 102 n.216 (citing authority).
128. UNIF. SEC. Acr § 303, 7B U.L.A. 515, 559 (1985).
129. In 1985, a revised Uniform Securities Act was promulgated. See UNIF. SEC. Acr
§ 303, 7B U.L.A. 515, 559 (1985). Section 303 of the revised Act also includes registration by
coordination for securities registered under the Securities Act.
The 1982 adoption by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Rule 415, permitting the shelf registration of securities (that is, offer and sale at any time within two years
after the effective date of the registration statement) inspired a new form of registration
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Third, at least some states have performed a significant enforcement role with respect to fraud in local securities offerings. But the
results vary significantly from state to state. In many jurisdictions,
parsimonious state budgets have meant understaffing of state securities law programs. In ten of the thirty jurisdictions covered by the
1984 survey described earlier,130 only one blue sky employee was an
attorney or certified public accountant, and Nevada boasted no professionals in either category. Inevitably, the state programs have
developed an erratic enforcement record. California - the largest
reporting state, with over 160 employees - was responsible for
sixty criminal convictions in 1984; twelve other states - including
such major jurisdictions as Connecticut, Florida, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia - reported either one or no criminal convictions that
year.131

by coordination (although it is often not called that). Currently over 30 jurisdictions
have either a registration by coordination procedure or an exemption for securities registered with the SEC under Rule 415.
1 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note l, at 103 n.219 and sources cited therein. In many jurisdictions, when a security is filed for the shelf with the SEC, Form U-1, the Uniform Application
to Register Securities, must be filed with the jurisdiction's securities administrator and will
remain effective typically either for a period of one year with a right to renew or for two
years. Registration at the local level generally becomes effective the moment the federal
registration statement becomes effective. See Therese H. Maynard, Blue Sky Regulation of

Rule 415 Shelf-Registered Primary Offerings: The Need for a Limited Form of Federal Preemption, 22 ARiz. ST. L.J. 89, 112 n.124, 113 (1990).
130. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
131. The 1984 data obtained from NASAA were as follows:
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Today, the most significant augmentative aspect of the state
blue sky laws may well be in providing broader private relief in
many instances than do the federal securities laws.132
A residual tension between federal and state securities law has
endured. While the mandatory disclosure system of the federal securities laws purports only to require full and complete disclosure
of material information, virtually all state jurisdictions specify standards for the denial, suspension, or revocation of securities registration.133 In approximately eighteen jurisdictions, traditional "merit"
regulations remain in force. 134 A significant additional number of
Cease &
Denials
Crim.
Consent
State
Desist Orders
etc.
Injunctions
Con.
Orders
Ala.
94
15
0
8
29
Cal.
67
95
9
60
N.A.
Conn.
8
2
0
1
2
Fla.
13
3
10
1
N.A.
Ga.
130
0
3
5
0
Idaho
N.A.
5
62
3
2
Ill.
38
8
1
2
N.A.
Iowa
29
1
10
0
10
Kan.
6
0
1
6
7
Ky.
7
3
0
0
3
Minn.
54
10
0
2
9
Mont
45
4
3
2
4
Neb.
12
10
0
5
0
Nev.
4
0
0
0
0
N.D.
18
3
1
0
0
Ohio
3
2
2
34
3
Okla.
N.A.
103
39
4
1
Or.
19
3
5
1
0
Pa.
N.A.
1
9
26
0
S.D.
8
0
0
0
0
Tenn.
8
16
0
8
20
Tex.
29
4
35
18
N.A.
Utah
0
12
0
1
0
Va.
N.A.
N.A.
10
1
6
Wash.
60
57
0
8
9
Wyo.
6
1
0
0
0
1 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 151. In this table, "Denials etc." represent Denials,
Suspensions, and Revocations; "Crim. Con." means Criminal Convictions; and "N.A." means
Not Ascertainable.
132. See 9 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 4133-34 n.3; Marc I. Steinberg, The Emergence of State Securities Laws: Partly Sunny Skies for Investors, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 395, 395
(1993).
133. See 1 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 105-07.
134. 'JYpical of these standards are those of Kansas and California. The Kansas Act of
1957 authorizes a stop order on any one of eight grounds, including a finding that the issuer's
"plan of business is unfair, inequitable, dishonest or fraudulent" or that "the securities offered .•• in payment for property, patents, formulae, good will, promotion or intangible
assets, are in excess of the reasonable value thereof, or the offering has been, or would be,
made with unreasonable amounts of options." KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1260(a)(l), (3)
(1988).
In California, the commissioner may refuse to issue a permit unless he finds, among other
things, that "the proposed plan of business of the applicant and the proposed issuance of
securities are fair, just, and equitable, [and] that the applicant intends to transact its business
fairly and honestly." CAL CoRP. CooE § 25140(b) (West 1977). The law also provides, how-
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jurisdictions employ a modified form of merit regulation, adopting
the language of Uniform Securities Act§ 306(a)(2)(F), which permits "merit" regulation only when "the offering has been or would
be made with unreasonable amounts of underwriters' and sellers'
discounts, commissions, or other compensation, or promoters' profits or participation, or unreasonable amounts or kinds of
options." 135
[I]n recent years, the wisdom of merit standards has emerged as the
leading policy debate concerning state securities regulation. As a
practical matter, there are two different patterns of merit regulation
today. First, there are generic rules aimed at regulating 'cheap stock,'
[or] excessive warrants and options . . . . Second, separate guidelines
regulate specific industries such as real estate[, or] oil and gas ....136

Proponents of merit regulation argue that by giving state securities administrators power to halt nonmeritorious issues, investors
are better protected from fraud or overreaching than they would be
under a pure disclosure form of regulation like the Securities Act of
1933. Empirical studies by Conrad Good.kind, Deputy Commissioner of Securities in Wisconsin, focusing on that state's merit standards between 1968 and 1971,137 and Ernest Walker and Beverly
ever, that when the commissioner takes the initiative to suspend or revoke a permit that has
already been issued, or in the first instance when the issuer has used the "notification" or
"coordination" procedure, as well as in all nonissuer offerings, the commissioner has the burden of finding that the proposed plan of business or issuance "is not fair, just, or equitable."
CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 25140~a) (West 1977) (emphasis added). Moreover, neither standard
applies in the case of a cash offering pursuant to a firm commitment underwriting in which
the issue is registered with the SEC under the 1933 Act and all the underwriters are registered with the SEC under the 1934 Act CAL. CoRP. CODE§ 25140(d) (West 1977).
135. UNIF. SEC. Acr § 306(a)(2)(F), 7B U.L.A. 515, 575 (1985); see also 1 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 109 n.233 (citing sources).
136. 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 110-15. "There is a fairly detailed literature
concerning merit regulation." 1 id. at 110 n.236; see also 1 id. at 110-12 n.236 (citing sources).
In 1986, the ABA's Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation
of Securities Committee published a Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings,
41 Bus. LAW. 785 (1986). The Report was not intended to be a brief for or against merit
regulation but was designed to "improve the quality of debate on this complex subject." Id.
at 788.
Among other recommendations, the Report urged (1) greater experimentation with blue
sky "safe harbors" as an alternative to repeal of merit regulation, (2) more realistic
NASAA guidelines, (3) greater SEC-NASAA cooperation[,] (4) a broader exemption
for publicly traded securities, [such as] those listed in the NASDAQ National Market
System List[,] (5) a transactional exemption for investment company offerings, and (6)
reconsideration of the NASAA guideline on "cheap stock."
1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 112 n.236.
137. See Conrad G. Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements?,
1976 WIS. L. REv. 79, 107-23. Goodkind attempted to study all 469 equity securities registered or denied for cause in Wisconsin between 1968 and 1971, with the exception of securities in noncash transactions such as mergers or exchange offers. Of these 469 securities, 121
could not be studied because issuers declined to respond to information requests or the Postal Service was unable to deliver correspondence. During the 1968-1971 period, there were
eight reasons for denial of registration: (i) insufficient promoters' equity investment; (ii) ex-
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Bailey Hadaway, respectively professors of management and finance, studying Texas issues between 1975 and 1980, suggest that
securities approved after merit review tend to have superior subsequent price performance than securities denied for cause or withdrawn from issuance in that state.13s
Even if one assumes that the case for merit regulation can be
persuasively articulated in a national context,139 this debate takes
on a different character when state law merit standards are applied
to domestic or foreign issuers that can sell securities abroad. If enforcement of merit standards tended to encourage the distribution
cessive cheap stock; (iii) excessive options and warrants issued or reserved for issuance; (iv)
excessive sales price in relation to market, price-earnings ratio, or other factors; (v) excessive
underwriters' compensation and selling expenses; (vi) inequitable shareholders' voting rights;
(vii) insufficiency of earnings to cover interest on debt securities or dividends on preferred
stock proposed to be issued; and (viii) miscellaneous factors such as unfairness of insider
transactions or unsound financial conditions of the issuer. Id. at 108-09. The principal results
of the study are summarized in the following table:
Aggregate Performance
(percent change)
Price
Price
Book
Book
Dividends
1 Year
3 years
1 year
3 years
for 3 years
All Denied
14.49
(14.23)
(14.68)
13.76
.84
All Registered
8.38
14.00
8.9
32.83
3.23
In this table, price and book value are expressed as a percentage change from offering price
or proforma book value at offering. Dividends for three years are expressed as a percentage
of offering price. In the "All Denied" category there were 137 issues measured for price and
127 for book value and dividends; in the "All Registered" category there were 211 issues
measured for price and 184 measured for book value and dividends. Id. at 111. Goodkind's
study was criticized in James S. Mofsky & Robert D. Tollison, Demerit in Merit Regulation, 60
MAR.a. L. REv. 367, 369-77 (1977) (emphasizing that the Goodkind study ignored costs of
merit regulation), and in Hugh H. Makens, Who Speaks for the Investor? An Evaluation of
the Assault on Merit Regulation, 13 U. BALT. L. REv. 435, 454-55 (1984) (criticizing
Goodkind for focusing solely on corporate equity offerings).
138. See Ernest W. Walker & Beverly Bailey Hadaway, Merit Standards Revisited: An
Empirical Analysis of the Efficacy of Texas Merit Standards, 7 J. CoRP. L. 651, 668-69 (1982).
Walker and Hadaway found that approved securities had a 56.60% return, as a percent of
the offering price, over a three-year holding period. Withdrawn securities had a 26.06% return. Id. at 675; see also WISCONSIN OFF. OF CoMMR. OF SEc., MERIT REvmw: IN nm
PUBLIC INTEREST? AN EMPIRICAL AND QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF MERIT REOULATION OP
CoMMON STOCK OFFERINOS IN WISCONSIN 16 (1986-87) ("[T]he Committee has found that
the perception that merit ri;view impedes economic growth is generally unfounded."). Compare, for instance, the FEDERAL TRADE CoMMN., STAFF REPORT, MINIMUM QUALITY VERsus DISCLOSURE REGULATIONS: STATE REOULATION OF INTERSTATE OPENED-END
INvEsrMENT CoMPANY AND CoMMON STOCK ISSUES (June 1987), which states,
Strongly risk averse small investors may have benefitted [from the merit review of common stock issuers], absent consideration of the costs of regulation that were not studied
here. Investors with diversified portfolios or small investors with less aversion to risk
would have preferred to have access to the issues that the merit states evaluated and so
were harmed by the regulations.
Id. at 80-81.
139. See 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 120-22 (discussing traditional criticisms of
merit regulation); see also Brian J. Fahrney, Comment, State Blue Sky Laws: A Stronger Case
for Federal Pre-Emption Due to Increasing Internationalization of Securities Markets, 86 Nw.
u. L. REv. 753, 765-68 (1992).
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of securities issuances solely abroad, this could not be rationalized
as advantaging either U.S. issuers or investors.
To some extent, most states have reduced the conflict between
their merit standards and actual or potential international offerings
by adopting a "marketplace exemption" from merit review for securities listed on the New York and American stock exchanges.140
Some states also exempt securities traded in the alternative overthe-counter market in the computerized NASDAQ National Market System list.141
The practical problem, given an increasingly international economy, is more fully to perfect a system of state securities regulation
that will not impede registration within the United States. Potentially, this might mean a system of partial preemption by the Securities Act of 1933 for registered offerings. Under such a system, the
states would be prohibited from imposing disclosure and other standards more demanding than those enforced under the Securities
Act of 1933.142 In effect, merit regulation for issues registered
under the federal Securities Act would be prohibited.
Such partial preemption would have little or no impact on those
states that today do not employ merit regulation or on those states
where merit regulation is effectively reserved for offerings exempt
from the 1933 Securities Act - for example, by dint of the marketplace exemption. Under this proposal, merit regulation would continue to exist in those states that wished to employ it for offerings
exempt from the Securities Act of 1933.
More significantly, all states could continue to require registration by coordination - that is, simultaneous with SEC registration
- and could continue to play a role in securities law enforcement.
But the filing requirements at the state level would essentially be
limited to the filing of documents required by the Securities Act of
1933 for registered offerings.
Besides simplifying the often quite burdensome task of "blue
skying" a securities issuance in up to fifty states as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam, partial preemption
along these lines would end concerns of domestic and foreign issuers about the possibility of being able to satisfy federal but not state
140. See 1 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 121; Mark A. Sargent, A Future for Blue
Sky Law, 62 U. CIN. L REv. 471, 474-75 (1993) (discussing the marketplace exemption).
141. Criteria for exchange listing and trading in the NASDAQ Nationiµ Market System
List are analyzed in 4 Loss & SEuGMAN, supra note 1, at 1733-2119; 5 id. at 2477-652; 6 id. at
2653-830. The NASAA Committee approved a model NMS exemption in 1986. State Registration Exemptions, NASAA Rep. (CCH) 'l'I 4811, 4821 (Mar. 14, 1986).
142. Such a proposal was made earlier in Fahrney, supra note 139, at 776-81.
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registration requirements, or the possibility that state registration
requirements might significantly delay or add to the costs of an
issuance.143
Inevitably, the application of merit standards to issuers capable
of selling securities abroad has and will continue to shrink.144 This
is not a consequence of an academic or purely domestic debate
about the wisdom of merit standards. It is, instead, a consequence
of the increasingly international context of securities sales. The
emergence of a global securities market ultimately should result in
the United States' federal level becoming the sole level of concern
for issuers capable of selling abroad. A concurrent system that operated well enough when securities sales were generally domestic
runs the risk of becoming self-defeating when securities issuers
have the option of selling in foreign securities markets.
B. The Securities Act of 1933
If the tendency in the boundary between federal and state securities laws is generally in favor of a further diminution of the state
role, matters are notably different with respect to the scope of the
Securities Act of 1933. This Act requires issuers to file a registration statement when distributing securities to the public.145 During
the past decades, the frequency with which corporate issuers have
had to provide a detailed description of their firms and their businesses in a registration statement has significantly declined, primarily as a result of the greater use of truncated, transaction-oriented
disclosure requirements and the use of the private placement exemption. The significance of the mandatory disclosure system
under the 1933 Act, in effect, has shrunk as a consequence of the
combined effect of the efficient market hypothesis, which suggested
that disclosure under the 1933 Act is unnecessary if the same disclosure is made to the market under the periodic requirements of the
Securities Exchange Act; the rise of foreign capital markets, which
created a practical alternative to the domestic sale of securities; and
143. See Sargent, supra note 140, at 490 ("Former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden suggested that the states should be out of the international regulatory game, except perhaps for
purposes of enforcement."). This article further quotes Breeden: "It is frustrating that as of
1991 Great Britain will allow the use of a prospectus filed in Berlin, but it will not be legal to
use automatically a prospectus filed with the SEC in California." Id. (quoting Breeden Re·
peats Call for Permitting U.S. Firms to Invest in Domestic Banks, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 351 (Mar. 9, 1990)). See generally Sargent, supra note 140, at 489-92.
144. Cf. Sargent, supra note 140, at 482-85 (explaining why merit regulation is becoming
irrelevant).
145. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988).
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the increased demand for securities by institutions, which effectively broadened the private placement market.
The practical consequence of these forces can be overstated.146
If a corporation provides the same material information to investors in an annual report that it previously provided in a registration
statement, the effect is formal rather than substantive.
There is, however, a larger point that has generally been missed
by those who view the mandatory disclosure system as withering.
While the internationalization of the securities markets may potentially lead to diminution of what must be disclosed, in the recent
past this impact has been dwarfed by a significant expansion of
what must be disclosed by all seasoned firms in their annual reports
to the SEC.
Let me place this larger point in context. The SEC's "integrated
disclosure system" has two major aspects. First, it coordinates required disclosures under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, in light of
an assumption of the efficient market hypothesis that information
effectively disseminated to the public will be rapidly reflected in
share prices regardless of the source of the data.141 This aspect of
the system is responsible for streamlined registration forms, notably
Forms S-2 and S-3 for registrants subject to the 1934 Act's continuous disclosure obligations. Second, the system also developed generic disclosure items for both 1933 Act registration and 1934 Act
registration and continuous reporting by adding a new Regulation
S-K (nonfinancial items) to the existing Regulation S-X (financial
items).148 Previously, required disclosures under the two Acts had
been developed independently of each other.
The first detailed articulation of the integrated disclosure system
concept was a highly influential 1966 law review article by Milton
146. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
147. The efficient market hypothesis is discussed supra at notes 91-92 and accompanying
text. The applicability of this hypothesis to an integrated disclosure system was considered in
several releases. See, e.g., Proposed Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of
Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-6235, 20 SEC Docket 1175, 1177-99
(Sept. 2, 1980); Reproposal of Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-6331, 23 SEC Docket 288, 290-91 (Aug. 18,
1981); Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 33-6383, 24
SEC Docket (CCH) 1262, 1267 (Mar. 26, 1982); see also Milton H. Cohen, The Integrated
Disclosure System- Unfinished Business, 40 Bus. LAw. 987, 992-95 (1985) (expressing concern that the quality of registration statements has been lowered); Jeffrey N. Gordon &
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60
N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 810-18 (1985); Lynn Nicholas, The Integrated Disclosure System and Its
Impact Upon Underwriters' Due Diligence: Will Investors Be Protected?, 11 SEC. REo. LJ. 3
(1983).
148. Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1994); Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (1994);
Form S-2, 17 C.F.R. § 230.12 (1994); Form S-3, 17 C.F.R. § 230.13 (1994).
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H. Cohen, the Special Study's director, entitled "Truth in Securities"
Revisited. 149 Cohen's article begins with the following thesis:
[T]he combined disclosure requirements of these statutes would have
been quite different if the 1933 and 1934 Acts (the latter as extended
in 1964) had been enacted in opposite order, or had been enacted as a
single, integrated statute - that is, if the starting point had been a
statutory scheme of continuous disclosures covering issuers of actively
traded securities and the question of special disclosures in connection
with public offerings had then been faced in this setting. Accordingly,
it is my plea that there now be created a new coordinated disclosure
system having as its basis the continuous disclosure system of the 1934
Act and treating "1933 Act" disclosure needs on this foundation.150
To achieve this coordinated - or integrated - disclosure system, Cohen urged that the disclosure process under the 1934 Act,
which '.'appears never to have been taken quite as seriously as
under the 1933 Act,"151 should "operate so that the public files contain, at any given time, information substantially equivalent to a
current 1933 Act prospectus ... with regard to any security in which
there is active investor interest. " 152 He proposed several measures
to bring the quality of 1934 Act disclosures closer to the level of
1933 Act filings: (i) the pertinent civil liability provisions in the two
Acts should be harmonized rather than retaining a considerably
milder standard under the 1934 Act; (ii) SEC review of 1934 Act
filings should resemble "in thoroughness and promptness" its review of 1933 Act filings; and (iii) there should be a uniform system
for numbering items in the basic registration and report forms.153
Further, Cohen urged that once the continuous disclosure system of
the 1934 Act has been improved "to the limits of practicability,"
"continuous registrants" that are fully subject to the reporting,
proxy soliciting, and insider trading provision of sections 13, 14, and
16 of the 1934 Act should be subject to "greatly relaxed" special
disclosure requirements under the 1933 Act, so that a public offering filing does not merely duplicate what already exists in the public
file.154 In contrast, Cohen also argued that a first-time registrant
should, as in the past, make a comprehensive 1933 Act filing.155
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. RE.v. 1340 (1966).
at 1341-42.
at 1361.
at 1368.
at 1368-75.
at 1379, 1406-07.
at 1407-08.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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While Cohen's logical argument was cogent, quite different factors ultimately led to the integration of the mandatory disclosure
system. First, it was generally recognized that the mechanisms of an
efficient market, in fact, appear to operate, at least with respect to
the most actively traded securities. In 1969, the SEC's Disclosure
Policy Study concurred with Cohen's proposal for a coordinated
disclosure system. In Disclosure to Investors: A Reappraisal of Administrative Policies under the '33 and '34 Securities Acts, 1s6 the SEC
argued that information in SEC filings would be rapidly disseminated because of intermediaries in the investment process - such
as professional money managers, brokerage firm research staffs,
and investment advisers, who would study these filings and "filter"
out key new information to a wider public - and also because of
advances in the technology of data dissemination. 157 Subsequently,
the SEC's 1977 Advisory Committee Report carried these points
further, asserting that "competition among analysts results in security prices that reflect a broad set of information."158 This competition, in part, is dependent on "a uniquely active and responsive
:financial press which facilitates the broad dissemination of highly
timely and material company-oriented information to a vast readership. "159 In effect, these SEC studies described mechanisms by
which an efficient market could operate. Subsequently, particularly
in its consideration of the eligibility requirements for the truncated
Form S-3, the SEC conservatively defined the class of companies
that it was confidenfwere subject to "efficient" information dissemination and analysis.
156. SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE Poucms
UNDER THE '33 AND '34 SECURITIES Acrs (1969).
157. Id. at 10, 48, 52-54 (noting that membership in the Financial Analysts Federation had
grown from 2422 members in 1950 to 11,752 by the end of 1967); id. at 63-64, 313-23 (noting
that the new technology at that time was microfiche).
158. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY CoMM. ON CoRP. DISCLOSURE TO THE.SEC, HOUSE
CoMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN CoMMERCE, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 620-21 (Comm. Print
1977) (footnote omitted). See generally id. at 618-52. By 1977 there were over 14,000 members in the Financial Analysts Federation. Id. at 620. As Professors Ronald Gilson and
Reinier Kraakman later wrote:
In today's securities markets, the dominant minority of informed traders is the community of market professionals, such as arbitragers, researchers, brokers and portfolio
managers, who devote their careers to acquiring information and honing evaluative
skills. The trading volume in most securities that these professionals control, directly or
indirectly, seems sufficient to assure the market's rapid assimilation into price of most
routine information.
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 10 VA. L.
REv. 549, 571 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
159. Proposed Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-6235, 20 SEC Docket 1175, 1179 (Sept. 2, 1980). This
Release relied on the findings of the Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the SEC, Nov. 3, 1977. See id. at 1179 n.12.
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At approximately the same time, a quite different factor
strengthened the momentum for truncating the disclosure requirements under the Securities Act. For several decades the SEC had
generally interpreted section 6(a) of that Act to permit registration
of only those securities that would be sold soon after the registration statement was declared effective.160 As a practical matter, this
view prevented "shelf registration," by which an issuer would register and leave the securities "on the shelf" until market conditions
warranted a "takedown," or sale of the securities.161
"A combination of regulatory and marketplace changes inspired
the Commission to reexamine the shelf registration issue early in
the 1980s . . . . [Most significantly], the growth of a competitive
Eurobond market placed SEC regulation of new issues in a new
international context. " 162 Unless SEC administration of the Securities Act permitted issuers to sell securities as rapidly in the United
States as in Europe, it was reasonable to assume that a considerable
portion of both American and foreign issues would exclusively be
sold abroad. In 1980, the SEC attempted to enable U.S. investors
to participate more effectively in the international bond market by
publishing a staff interpretation - known at the SEC as the "Kingdom of Sweden" Release - indicating that foreign governments
and their political subdivisions would be permitted to sell debt issues "off the shelf" in the United States if they undertook to file
posteffective .amendments with the SEC.163
160. The last sentence of§ 6(a) provides: "A registration statement shall be deemed effective only as to the securities specified therein as proposed to be offered." Securities Act
§ 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1988). For the legislative history of this section, see H.R. REP. No.
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 18-20 (1933), and H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 25
(1933). See also Scott Hodes, Shelf Registration: The Dilemma of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 VA. L. REv. 1106 (1963) (urging that a strict interpretation of§ 6(a)
prohibits all shelf registrations).
In administrative opinions early in its history, the SEC interpreted this sentence to mean
"that Congress contemplated that registration should be effective only in connection with
offerings proposed to be made in the proximate future." Shawnee Chiles Syndicate, 10 SEC
109, 113 (1941) (footnote omitted). One of the draftsmen, Benjamin V. Cohen, is said to
have confinned that this was the intention. See Hodes, supra, at 1110 n.17.
161. There were limited exceptions to the long-standing prohibition on shelf registration.
See 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 355-56.
162. 1 id. at 357-58.
163. Eurobonds, in essence, are bonds issued abroad - in Europe and elsewhere effectively outside any national regulatory system. See Interpretative Release Relating to
Delayed Offerings by Foreign Governments or Political Subdivisions Thereof, Securities Act
Release No. 33-6240, 20 SEC Docket 1358 (Sept 10, 1980); see also OFFICE OF CHIEF ECON·
OMIST, SEC, EURODOLLAR BONDS: ALTERNATIVE FINANCING FOR UNITED STATES COMPANIES 10 (1985) (arguing that the most important reason for the growth of the market "is that
U.S. firms believe that they can borrow at lower interest costs overseas than in the United
States"); REPORT ON INTERNATIONALIZATION, supra note 63, at 11-8 to 11-10, 111-4 to III-58;
Interpretive Release Relating to Continuous and Delayed Offerings by Foreign Govern-
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Cumulatively, the general recognition of the mechanisms of an
efficient market for information dissemination and the potential for
significant export of U.S. securities sales persuaded the SEC in 1982
to adopt both the current integrated disclosure system and shelf registration Rule 415.164
The integrated disclosure system permits specified seasoned issuers using a truncated Form S-3165 to file a brief registration statement primarily describing the securities issuance and recent
material changes166 and then to incorporate by reference the following: (i) its latest Form 10-K annual report, (ii) subsequent quarterly and monthly 1934 Act reports, and (iii) if capital stock is to be
registered and the same class is registered under section 12 of the
ments or Political Subdivisions Thereof, Securities Act Release No. 33-6424, 26 SEC Docket
(CCH) 20 (Sept. 2, 1982).
The significance of the Eurobond market to the development of Rule 415 is widely recognized. See, e.g., Beth McGoldrick, Life with Rule 415, INSTITUTIONAL INvEsToR, Feb. 1983,
at 129, 130; Steve Lohr, Rolling in Money in London, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1986, § 3, at 1.
164. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 33-6383,
24 SEC Docket (CCH) 1318 (Mar. 3, 1982); see also 17 C.F.R. § 229 (1994) (Regulation S-K
disclosures); 47 Fed. Reg. 39,803, amending 47 Fed. Reg. 11, 401 (1982) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.512(a) (1994)) (adoption of Item 512(a) undertakings); 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,394
(1982) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(3) (1994)) (adoption ofRule 415 regarding delayed
or continuous offering and sale of securities):
165. Initially the Commission adopted two general types of eligibility requirements for
Form S-3:
First, there [were] registrant requirements. American companies (and under certain circumstances foreign private issuers) [were required to] have reported under the 1934 Act
for the past 36 calendar months, with a default-free record since the end of the last fiscal
year on dividend and sinking fund installments on preferred stock, debt installments, or
long-term lease rentals if the defaults in the aggregate were material to the financial
position of the registrant. Second, there [were] transaction requirements. A company
satisfying the registrant requirements could [then] use Form S-3: (1) for primary cash
offerings if it had the requisite $150 million float [-that is, stock ownership by outside
shareholders rather than the inside central group -] or a $100 million float and annual
trading volume of at least 3 million shares; (2) for primary cash offerings of "investment
grade" nonconvertible debt or nonconvertible preferred stock; (3) for secondary offerings offered by any person other than the issuer (including underwriters) if securities of
the same class were listed on a national securities exchange or quoted in NASDAQ; or
(4) for certain rights offerings, dividend or interest reinvestment plans or conversions or
warrants.
2 Loss & SEUOMAN, supra note 1, at 615-16. For background on the Release, see 2 id. at
608-12.
In 1992, the SEC adopted revisions to Form S-3 that (i) shortened from 36 to 12 months
the minimum issuer reporting requirements for all offerings of non-asset-backed securities;
(ii) reduced the minimum public float requirement for issuers with at least $75 million in
voting stock held by nonaffiliates; and (iii) added offerings of investment grade asset-backed
securities qualified to be registered for automatic effectiveness upon filing of a Form S-3
relating solely to a dividend or interest reinvestment plan. Simplification of Registration
Procedures for Primary Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-6943, 51 SEC
Docket (CCH) 1501 (July 16, 1992) (proposal); Securities Act Release No. 33-6964, 52 SEC
Docket (CCH) 2015 (Oct. 22, 1992) (adoption).
166. Specifically, a registrant filing on Form S-3 must include Items 202, 501-12, 601, and
702 of Regulation S-K and information on material changes. Each of these items and the
concept of material changes are described in 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 663-64.
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1934 Act, a description of the class of securities that is contained in
a registration statement filed under the 1934 Act, including amendments or reports filed to update the description.161
Rule 415, the new shelf registration rule, permits specified seasoned issuers eligible to file on Form S-3 to register for the shelf for
up to two years.168 A variety of economic benefits have been attributed to the rule. Studies suggest that the opportunity Rule 415
provides to time the issuance of offerings to take advantage of market conditions permits lower issuer costs.169 Underwriter competition to distribute primary offerings has similarly led to lower
underwriting spreads.170 The issuer's cost of compliance with the
Securities Act's registration procedure has also been reduced.111
167. Each of the reports is incorporated by reference and is analyzed in 4 id. at 1854-84.
168. Rule 415(a)(l)(x), 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(l)(x) (1994).
Both before and after the final adoption of Rule 415, a considerable proportion of securities registered with the SEC have been registered "for the shelf." In the adoption Release,
the SEC summarized experience with Temporary Rule 415 in the following terms: "From
March 1982 through September 1983, almost 4,600 shelf registration statements relating to
$181 billion were filed. These shelf filings represent 52 % of the over 8,800 registration statements and 52% of $345 billion of securities registered during this period." Shelf Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-6499, 29 SEC Docket (CCH) 169, 171-77 (Nov. 17, 1983).
169. See 29 SEC Docket (CCH) at 170 (summarizing several studies); OmCB OF CHmF
ECONOMIST, SEC, UPDATE - RuLE 415 AND EoUITY MARKErs 21 (Dec. 1984) [hereinafter
OmCB OF CHmF ECONOMISTS (Dec. 1984)] (estimating that shelf-registered equity offerings
have lower issuing costs of about 0.630 cents per dollar raised for syndicated offerings and
about 1.363 cents per dollar of equity raised for nonsyndicated offerings); OmCB OF CmEF
ECONOMIST, SEC, EXPLAINING THE SAVINGS FROM RULE 415: THE DEBT MARKET 15 (Sept.
17, 1984) (noting that industrial bond issues sold by shelf registration sell for about 20 basis
points less, holding all other important factors constant, than similar negotiated issues);
Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration: An
Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REv. 135, 149-53 (1984) (presenting a survey of several studies); David S. Kidwell et al., SEC Rule 415: The Ultimate Competitive Bid, 19 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 183, 194 (1984) (finding "that debt issues sold under Rule 415 sell
between 30 and 40 basis points less than comparable negotiated sales").David S. Kidwell et
al., Shelf Registration: Competition and Market Flexibility, 30 J.L. & EcoN. 181 (1987) (finding that industrial bond issues sold by shelf registration sell for 20 basis points less than
similar nonshelf sales).
170. See OmCB OF CHmF EcoNOMIST (Dec. 1984) supra note 169, at 5-6; Memorandum
from the Office of the Chief Economist to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Spillover Effects of Shelf Registration: Underwriting Spreads on Negotiated Industrial Debt and
Equity Issues (Dec. 5, 1984) (on file with the-Office of the Chief Economist) (using a sample
of industrial debt and common stock issues sold between January 1977 and June 1983, and
concluding that shelf registration had increased competition in the investment banking industry and therefore had resulted in lower underwritten spreads in both shelf and negotiated
issues); McGoldrick, supra note 163, at 130-31 (examining new risks for underwriters created
by Rule 415); see also supra note 169 and sources cited therein.
171. See Shelf Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-6499, 29 SEC Docket (CCH)
169, 171(Nov.17,1983) ("Legal, accounting, printing and other costs are stated to have been
reduced, because only a single registration statement need be filed for a series of offerings,
rather than a separate registration statement each time an offering is made.")
In all, the SEC "conservatively" estimated total issuer savings of $280 million in 1983.
Memorandum to George Kundahl, [SEC] Executive Director, from David Malmquist, Re:
Estimates of Savings to Issuers Resulting from Rule 415 (May 17, 1984), reprinted in SEC
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At the same time, there is also little question that Rule 415
sharply reduced the ability of the managing underwriter to conduct
a due diligence review.172 The registration statement normally is
prepared solely by the issuer in a Rule 415 filing, rather than in
conjunction with an underwriter. This reduces the ability of the underwriter to provide an effective review of the registration statement. Whether the issuer's cost savings justify this loss in due
diligence is debatable. But, to keep this debate in context, it should
Oversight and Technical Amendments: Hearing Before the Subcomm on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Fm. of House Comm on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 322-24 (1984); see also Banoff, supra note 169, at 145-46; A.F. Ehrbar, Upheaval in
Investment Banking, FORTUNE, Aug. 23, 1982, at 90, 92.
172. The SEC has recognized that an underwriter's reasonable investigation will vary depending on such "relevant circumstances" as "the type of underwriting arrangement ... and
the availability of information with respect to the registrant." Rule 176(g), 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.176(g) (1994).
The effect of Rule 415 on underwriter due diligence was a major point emphasized in
Commissioner Thomas's dissent to the SEC's September, 1982 extension of temporary Rule
415. See Delayed or Continuous Offering and Sale of Securities, Securities Act Release No.
33-6423, 26 SEC Docket (CCH) 2, 15-16 (Sept. 2, 1982).
In adopting the final version of Rule 415, the SEC responded by noting that some issuers
had developed continuous due diligence programs or periodic due diligence meetings.
Others, emulating practice under the former Rule 50 of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1988), had begun appointing a law firm to act as underwriters' counsel
before the underwriter was selected. See Shelf Regulation, 29 SEC Docket (CCH) at 172.
While concurring in the majority's decision, Chairman Shad was plainly dubious that these
and other procedures would fully compensate for the qualitative loss in underwriter due diligence. See 29 SEC Docket (CCH) at 176.
The former Director of the Special Study of the Securities Markets, Milton H. Cohen, in a
thoughtful address, suggested that a new statutory treatment of § 18 of the Securities Exchange Act should be adopted to bring that Section closer to § 11 of the Securities Act as one
means to develop appropriate liability standards in an integrated disclosure system. Compare Exchange Act § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988) with Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 78c
(1988). Cohen then added:
With regard to the due diligence obligation of underwriters, and perhaps others, in
connection with a public offering, we must then make a policy choice. Either we must
conform the obligation to the practical needs of a marketing system in which competition, speed, and economy are dominant objectives, or else we must insist that those
objectives not be pursued to the point that due diligence is impaired. But I would emphasize particularly that this policy choice will be much easier and less painful if the first
two steps have been taken, that is, if continuous disclosure files have been brought to the
highest practicable levels of quality and currency through appropriate statutory and regulatory changes. On that assumption, there should be little if any impairment of investor
protection if the section 11 due diligence obligation at the time of a public offering were
moderated; or, going the other way, the burdens and risks to underwriters would be
brought within more tolerable limits even if the theoretical obligation were not
moderated.
Cohen, supra note 147, at 994; cf. Dana B. Klinges, Note, Expanding the Liability of Managing Underwriters Under the Securities Act of 1933, 53 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1063 (1985).
Harvard Business School professors Auerbach and Hayes alternatively proposed that
Rule 415 or§ 11 or both be amended so that (i) leading issuers would be made solely responsible for Rule 415 issues; (ii) for the least qualified issuers, Rule 415 would remain unmodified; and (iii) for an in-between group, underwriters would be permitted to avoid liability if a
reasonable investigation had been made by professional experts or agencies. JosEPH
AUERBACH & SAMUELL. HAYES, Ill, INVESTMENT BANKING AND DIUGENCE: WHAT PRICE
DEREGULATION? 189-98 (1986).
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be borne in mind that the type of distribution involved in a nontraditional Rule 415 issue typically will be a debt offering filed on
Form S-3. Both because of the usually reduced investor risk in debt
offerings and because of the integrated disclosure system, this
would appear to be the type of distribution for which some sacrifice
in due diligence could most readily be accommodated.
During the same period, when Form S-3 and Rule 415 were being adopted, a third significant change in the scope of the registration requirements of the 1933 Act also occurred. It had always
been an underlying premise of the Securities Act that "private
placements" of securities to institutional investors or a limited
number of sophisticated investors would not have to be registered.173 During the last few decades, the proportion of new corporate financing conducted through private placement, rather than
public sale, has increased substantially. In 1970, for example, approximately 17% of all corporate securities sales were private. Between 1984 and 1987, the figure ranged from 30% to 39%.114 The
vast preponderance of private placements involve the sale of debt
to institutional investors.175 To facilitate the institutional market in
the resale of privately placed securities, the SEC in 1990 adopted

173. See supra note 55. This exemption now appears in § 4(2) of the Act. See Securities
Act§ 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4) (1988). For discussion of the private placement exemption, see
generally 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 1350-1450.
174. A 1988 SEC release included the following table:
New Corporate Public and Private Financing
(Millions of Dollars)
Percent
Percent
Total New
Public
Public
Private
Private
Financing
1970
31,130
83
6;373
17
37,503
1975
46,828
78
13,515
22
60;343
1980
57;330
78
15,700
22
73,030
1981
56,085
75
18,400
25
74,485
1982
62,566
72
24;300
28
86,866
1983
97,103
73
35,600
27
133,703
1984
82,199
61
53,258
39
135,457
1985
138,288
65
73,093
35
211;380
1986
286,040
70
123,457
30
409,497
1987
271,477
66
139;355
34
410,832
Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to Method of Detennining Holding Periods of Restricted Securities Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 33-6806, 42 SEC Docket
(CCH) 76, 78 (Oct. 25, 1988).
175. 4i SEC Docket (CCH) at 77-84. Another table in the same release reported the
following:
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Rule 144A,176 which permits qualified institutional buyers to
purchase specified privately placed securities without registration
under the Securities Act.111
The combination of Form S-3, Rule 415, and the increased proportion of institutional private placements has substantially reduced
the scope of the Securities Act of 1933. This, in effect, represents
the most significant erosion of the federal securities laws'
mandatory disclosure system since the New Deal period.
The integrated disclosure system - and implicitly the shelf registration and private placement concepts - are grounded in what
the SEC terms "the principle of equivalency":
Integration, as a concept, involves a conclusion as to equivalency bet.ween transactional (Securities Act) and periodic (Exchange Act) reporting. If a subject matter is material information (other than a
description of the transaction itself), then it will be material both in
the distribution of securities and to the trading markets.
Moreover, requirements governing the description of such subject
matters should be the same [for] both purposes....
. . . [T]he concept of integration also proceeds from the observation that information is regularly being furnished to the market
through periodic reports under the Exchange Act. This information is
evaluated by professional analysts and other sophisticated users, is
available to the financial press and is obtainable by any other person
who seeks it for free or at nominal cost. To the extent that the market
accordingly acts efficiently, and this information is adequately reflected in the price of a registrant's outstanding securities, there seems
little need to reiterate this information in a prospectus in the context
of a distribution.178
Amount of Private Placements by 'fype of Security
(Millions of Dollars)
Percent
Percent
Debt
Debt
Equity
Equity
Total
1965
9,562
97
~
-39,820
1975
12,852
95
663
5
13,515
1980
13,800
88
1,900
12
15,700
1981
16,000
87
2,400
13
18,400
1982
20,700
85
3,600
15
24,300
1983
28,800
81
6,800
19
35,600
1984
43,600
82
9,700
18
53,300
1985
60,565
83
12,528
17
73,093
1986
110,524
90
12,933
10
123,457
1987
122,124
88
17,231
12
139,355
42 SEC Docket (CCH) at 79. See generally Symposium, Exemptions for Institutional Investors or Concepts of Non-Public Offerings: A Comparative Study, 13 U. PA. J. INTL. Bus. L.
473 (1993).
176. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A {1994).
177. Securities Act Release No. 33-6862, 46 SEC Docket (CCH) 26 (Apr. 23, 1990); see
Loss & SEuGMAN, supra note 1, at 384-404 (1994 Ann. Supp.).
178. Proposed Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-6235, 20 SEC Docket 1175, 1177 (Sept. 2, 1980).
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The difficulty with the principle of equivalency is that the registrant's preparation of information under the 1933 and 1934 Acts is
not equivalent. This remains true in the sense recognized by Milton
H. Cohen that the pertinent civil liability provisions in the 1933 and
1934 Acts are different, with milder standards operative under the
1934 Act. 179 Although every underwriter who participates in a securities offering may be held liable under section 11 of the 1933
Act, there is no statutory provision ensuring that underwriters will
perform a comparable role by way of monitoring the quality of 1934
Act reports.180 This means, in effect, that in a substantial proportion of securities sales, underwriters will not be responsible for conducting a due diligence investigation.181
While this represents a real loss in terms of investor protection,182 both the significance of the reduced effective scope of the
1933 Act and the reduced role of underwriters in performing due
diligence on registered offerings has been dwarfed by a countervailing development.
The past two decades have witnessed a significant expansion in
what must be disclosed by all registrants in their 1934 Act Form 10K annual reports and by new issuers when they register securities
under the 1933 Act. This expansion, in effect, represents a "soft
information revolution" in the mandatory disclosure system.
Before 1972, the SEC generally only permitted registrants to file
historical or "hard" information and generally prohibited projections of future or "soft" information. There were three somewhat
179. See Cohen, supra note 147, at 992-95; supra text accompanying note 153; see also
David M Green, Comment, Due Diligence under Rule 415: Is the insurance Worth the Premium?, 38 EMORY L.J. 793 (1989); cf. Herb Frerichs, Jr., Underwriter Due Diligence Within
the Integrated Disclosure System - If It Isn't Broken, Don't Fix lt, 16 SEC. REo. L.J. 386
(1989).
180. To be sure, underwriters, in some circumstances, can be held liable for documents
incorporated by reference into a registration statement. But the SEC has adopted Rule
176(h), 17 C.F.R. § 230.176(h) (1994), which as a practical matter may obviate the liability of
an underwriter when it had no responsibility for the preparation of a document incorporated
by reference.
181. Under § 11 of the Securities Act. underwriters can be held liable for material misrepresentations or omissions in a registration statement unless they carry the burden of proving that they conducted a reasonable investigation and had reasonable grounds to believe
and did believe that the registration statement was true when it became effective. See Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (1988). See generally 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at
4246-78.
182. On the other hand, there are substantial advantages of the integrated disclosure system in terms of reduction of issuer document preparation costs, swifter SEC review of fonns
such as Form S-3, better registrant control over when to go to the capital markets, and improved quality of 1934 Act reports. Whether these advantages outweigh the likely deterioration in the preparation of some 1933 Act registration statements endures as a pivotal policy
question concerning the integrated disclosure system.
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overlapping bases for this exclusionary policy. Frrst, the relevant
constituency for SEC documents was assumed to be the unsophisticated investor. An Advisory Committee Report on disclosure explained: "The disclosure objective of providing meaningful
information to the investment community has, in cases of perceived
conflict, been subordinated to the objective of protecting unsophisticated investors from their own ignorance."183 Thus, the exclusion
of projections was justified as necessary to prevent them from being
given undue credence by investors or being manipulated by managers. Second, projections were then viewed not as "facts" but as inherently unreliable. Third, paradoxically, investors were
characterized as being just as competent as managers to make projections. The last two points were memorably articulated by Harry
Heller, a senior SEC attorney, in a 1961 law review article:
As early as 1904 Veblen expressed the view that the value of an investment basically is a function of future earning power....
The question will be raised, if the determination of future earnings
is the prime task confronting the investor, why not require or permit a
direct prediction of such earnings? The answer to this is that the Securities Act, like the hero of "Dragnet" is interested exclusively in
facts. Conjectures and speculations as to the future are left by the Act
to the investor on the theory that he is as competent as anyone to
predict the future from the given facts. Since an expert can speak
with authority only as to subjects upon which he has professional
knowledge and since no engineering course or other professional
training has ever been known to qualify anyone as a clairvoyant, attempts by companies to predict future earnings on their own or on the
authority of experts have almost invariably been held by the Commission to be misleading because they suggest to the investor a competence and authority which in fact does not exist.184

On these bases, the SEC, in essence, took the view that projections
were per se misleading and so stated in a note to one of its proxy
rules.185
By the early 1970s, the SEC's exclusionary policy was under severe criticism. One influential critic was Professor Homer Kripke.
In a 1970 law review article, he dismissed the SEC's policy as "non183. REPORT OF nm ADVISORY CoMM. ON CoRP. DISCLOSURE TO nm SEC, HOUSE
CoMM. ON INTERsrATE AND FOREIGN CoMMERCE, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 348 (Comm. Print
1977). See generally id. at 344-79, A-265 to A-329.
184. Harry Heller, Disclosure Requirements under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus.
LAw. 300, 304, 307 (1961) (footnotes omitted). _
185. Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 note (1994) (proscribing predictions of specific
future market values, earnings, or dividends); see also Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400, 408-10 (N.D. Ill. 1964). The Note was later withdrawn. See Securities
Act Release No. 33-5699, 9 SEC Docket 472 (Apr. 23, 1976).
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sense."186 Noting that "most sizeable corporations use projections
of future sales and revenues and capital needs as the basis for making very important decisions as to borrowing, building new plants,
establishing new branches, ordering materials, hiring and training
labor, etc.," Kripke urged, "The public is certainly not as able as the
management of a corporation to understand the meaning, results
and implications of the complex accounting events which have occurred in any dynamic company or of differential rates of improvement or decline in the sales volume and profitability of different
product lines. "187
Thus, a more realistic fear, argued Kripke, was that by prohibiting disclosure of earnings projections, the SEC had perpetuated a
form of differential disclosure: "The professionals get management
projections informally through press conferences, speeches to analysts' societies or press releases, and these projections form the basis for professional judgments. Under its present system the SEC
precludes the giving of this information equally to all investors
through the documents filed with it ...."188
By the late 1970s, the SEC reversed its position and adopted
safe harbor rules to encourage disclosure of soft information.189
More significantly, as· part of its 1982 integrated disclosure system,
the SEC adopted Item 303, which mandates management discussion
and analysis of known trends or uncertainties concerning a registrant's liquidity, capital resources, and income.190 Item 303 is the
key part of the evolution of the SEC's approach to accounting from
an emphasis on "hard fact" to its present emphasis on "soft" or
predictive information. It is a comprehensive disclosure item. In
effect, the SEC staff has employed the concepts of liquidity and
capital resources to require managers to comment on material
changes that may occur in a registrant's balance sheet and the concept of results of operations to inspire similar disclosures concerning a registrant's income statement.

186. See Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45
N.Y.U. L. REv.1151, 1198 (1970).
187. Id. at 1197-98.
188. Id. at 1199.
189. Rule 175, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1994) (under the 1933 Act); Rule 3b-6, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.3b-6 (1994) (under the 1934 Act). See discussion and analysis in 2 Loss & SEUOMAN,
supra note 1, at 622-36.
190. Regulation S-K Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1994); see 2 Loss & SEUOMAN, supra
note 1, at 668-72.
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In 1989, the SEC published an interpretation release concerning
Item 303.191 The release highlighted, among other topics, that the
SEC now regarded disclosure of predictive or soft information as
mandatory in a wide variety of circumstances.192 This mandate was
still more recently given "teeth" by $EC enforcement actions specifically based on Item 303.193
When the changes in the scope of the 1933 Act registration
statement requirements and the "soft information" expansion of
the disclosure requirements are considered simultaneously, predictions that the SEC's mandatory disclosure system will soon wither
or die194 appear to be premature. To be sure, foreign issuers have
declined to be listed on U.S. securities markets because of our more
191. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 33-6835, 43
SEC Docket (CCH) 1330 (May 18, 1989).
192. The SEC explained the "critical distinction" between mandatory and voluntary disclosure of soft information as follows:
The Project results confirm that the distinction between prospective information that
is required to be discussed and voluntary forward-looking disclosure is an area requiring
additional attention. This critical distinction is explained in the Concept Release:
Both required disclosure regarding the future impact of presently known trends,
events or uncertainties and optional forward-looking information may involve some prediction or projection. The distinction between the two rests with the nature of the prediction required. Required disclosure is based on currently known trends, events, and
uncertainties that are reasonably expected to have material effects, such as: A reduction in
the registrant's product prices; erosion in the registrant's market share; changes in insurance coverage; or the likely non-renewal of a material contract. In contrast, optional
forward-looking disclosure involves anticipating a futu.re trend or event or anticipating a

less predictable impact of a known event, trend or uncertainty.
43 SEC Docket (CCH) at 1333 (relying heavily on Concept Release on Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Operations, Securities Act Release 33-6711,
38 SEC Docket (CCH) 138, 140-41 (Apr. 17, 1987)).
193. In In re Caterpillar, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 34-30,532, 51 SEC Docket
(CCH) 147 (Mar. 31, 1992), the SEC issued a cease-and-desist order for Caterpillar's failure
to disclose information about its Brazilian subsidiary, CBSA, which was responsible in 1989
for 23% of Caterpillar's net profits although its revenues represented only 5% of the parent
company's revenues. The SEC, after explaining that Caterpillar was not required to prepare
its consolidated financial statements showing CBSA as either an industry segment or a foreign operation, emphasized: "Since separate information about CBSA was neither required
nor provided in Caterpillar's financial statements or the notes thereto, there was little, if any,
information in the financial statements or accompanying notes that would inform a reader as
to the importance of CBSA's earnings to Caterpillar's overall results of operations." 51 SEC
Docket (CCH) at 152. This was required both because the CBSA earnings materially affected Caterpillar's reported income from continuing operations, and because there was a
future uncertainty regarding CBSA's operations, as well as a concomitant possible risk of
Caterpillar having materially lower earnings as a result of that risk. 51 SEC Docket (CCH)
at 152-53.
In In re Shared Med. Sys. Corp., Securities Act Release No. 33-33,632, 56 SEC Docket
(CCH) 199 (Feb. 17, 1994), the Commission settled a cease-and-desist proceeding with an
issuer that disclosed a known unfavorable trend in sales activity in a February 17, 1987 press
release but failed to make the same disclosure in the Management Discussion and Analysis
(MD&A) portion of its 1986 Form 10-K annual report or in its first quarter 1987 Form 10-Q.
194. Cf. Winter, supra note 19.
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demanding disclosure requirements.195 But the pressure to reduce
U.S. disclosure requirements to secure foreign "listings" appears, at
least momentarily, to have dissipated in 1993 when Daimler-Benz
AG became the first German firm to register in the U.S. securities
markets in recent years.196
Over time, competitive pressure from foreign securities markets
will ultimately lead to further changes in the mandatory disclosure
system. But, it is as yet uncertain whether future changes will be of
a fundamental nature, like the scope reductions represented by
Form S-3 and Rule 415, or of a more tinkering nature, such as immaterial changes in U.S. generally accepted accounting principles
applicable to foreign registrants.197 To put this another way, it is no
more certain for the foreseeable future that the United States will
have to make further fundamental changes in its mandatory disclosure system to retain domestic or foreign securities sales than it is
that foreign issuers will have to comply with U.S. standards in order
to have access to the U.S. securities markets, currently the world's
largest. What the experience with Form S-3 and Rule 415 has
taught, however, is that concern that securities sales will be exported remains the most erosive potential element in federal securities regulation.
C. Municipal Securities Regulation
It also seems clear that in the foreseeable future there may well
be further significant expansion of the SEC's role in one of its largest areas of exemption, municipal securities regulation.198
195. See Joseph McLaughlin, Listing Foreign Stocks on U.S. Exchanges: Time to Confront
Reconciliation?, 24 REv. SEc. & COMMODITIES REo. 91 (1991).
196. See Breeden Announces Daimler-Benz Will File to Trade Stock in U.S. Markets, 25
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 477 (Apr. 2, 1993). Notably, Daimler-Benz agreed to provide
financial infonnation prepared in accordance with the United States' generally accepted accounting principles. Id. at 478.
In late 1991, the NYSE let it be known that it was drafting a proposal to relax foreign
listing standards. Under this proposal, foreign issuers would not have to file financial statements prepared on the basis of accounting principles generally accepted in the United States.
Chainnan Breeden testified on July 25, 1991, that he opposed this type of "retreat" from U.S.
accounting standards. NYSE Drafting Plan to Boost Listings by Foreign Firms, Despite SEC
Opposition, 23 Sec. Reg. & L Rep. (BNA) 1754 (Dec. 20, 1991).
197. Ct Edward F. Greene et al., Hegemony or Deference: U.S. Disclosure Requirements
in the International Capital Markets, 50 Bus. LAw. (forthcoming Feb.1995) (discussing possible changes in the mandatory disclosure system and advocating an approach giving greater
deference to the disclosure systems of foreign countries).
198. See 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 1159 ("In contemporary finance, the term
municipal securities broadly refers to securities issued by states, their political subdivisions
such as cities, towns, or counties, or their instrumentalities such as school districts or port
authorities."); 3 id. at 1159-73; 1 id. at 285-307.
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Municipal securities are usually categorized into two general
types. First, there are general obligation securities that are backed
by the taxing power or "full faith and credit" of the issuing governmental unit. Second, there are revenue securities backed solely by
the revenues from a specific project such as a port, airport, bridge,
or tunnel authority. In recent years, only twenty-five to thirty percent of all municipal securities have been "general obligations"; approximately seventy to seventy-five percent have been revenue
bonds.199 One form of revenue bond, the industrial development or
conduit bond, has proved particularly controversial. Industrial development bonds are issued by a local government agency to buy or
build a facility or to purchase equipment that a private business
firm will then buy on installment or lease over periods that typically
run from five to thirty years. The business firm will pay a rent that
usually is equal to the amount necessary to pay principal and interest on the bonds. Because the only security for the bonds is the
revenue from the lease payments paid by the business firm - or
the facility leased by the firm - the SEC in 1978 took the position
"that industrial development bonds ... in substance are obligations
of a business enterprise" and therefore "are sufficiently distinct
from other municipal securities to warrant treatment under a separate regulatory framework."200

In 1993, the SEC Staff Report on the Municipal Securities Market, [1993 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <J: 85,217 (Sept. 3, 1993) [hereinafter SEC Staff Report], stated:
"The municipal securities market comprises approximately 50,000 state and local issuers with
an outstanding principal amount of securities in excess of $1.2 trillion.... Approximately
2,600 municipal securities dealers, banks, and brokers actively trade in municipal securities."
Id. 'I 84,334.
Later, the Commission added:
In 1993, a record level of over $335 billion in municipal securities was sold, representing over 17,000 issues. This record financing was heavily influenced by refundings. Nevertheless, the level of long term new money financings, representing 49% of financings
for the year, reflected continued growth. In 1993, there were $142 billion of new money
long term financings, compared to $81 billion in 1988, a 75% increase.
Statement of the Commission Regarding Disclosure Obligations of Municipal Securities Issuers and Others, Securities Act Release No. 33-7049, 56 SEC Docket (CCH) 479, 480-81
(Mar. 9, 1994).
199. GENERAL AccoUNTING OrnCE, TRENDS AND CHANGES IN nm MUNICIPAL BoND
MARKET AS THEY RELATE TO FINANCING STATE AND LoCAL Ptrauc INFRASTRUCIURE 50
(1983).
200. Letter to Senator Harrison Williams from SEC Chairman Harold Williams, May 1,
1978, reprinted in 124 CoNG. REc. 21,639 (July 19, 1978); see also Robert A. Fippinger, Secur-

ities Law Disclosure Requirements for the Political Subdivision Threatened with Bankruptcy,
10 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 541, 546-47 (1982); Eric M. Hellige, Industrial Development Bonds:
The Disclosure Dilemma, 6 J. CoRP. L. 291 (1981).
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Nonetheless, section 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act exempts virtually
all municipal securities.201 The near default of New York City securities between 1974 and 1975 and the subsequent default by the
Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) after expending
$2.25 billion to construct two nuclear power plants revived the debate as to whether issuers, particularly of industrial revenue 1,)onds,
should be subject to a mandatory disclosure system comparable to
that for corporate issuers.202
As the full Commission explained after the 1988 staff report on
WPPSS:
[T]he most disturbing aspect of the Supply System problems is that
they arose after the New York City Report, after the subsequent voluntary improvements in municipal disclosure, and after most of the
additional regulatory actions discussed [elsewhere]. Events such as
the Supply System default inevitably focus attention on the adequacy
of the current regulation of the municipal securities markets.2 03

Moreover, the SEC found that the New York City and WPPSS
instances were not isolated:
In the period from 1972 to 1983, there were eleven defaults involving
general obligation instruments, 25 defaults involving non-conduit rev201. Securities Act§ 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(z) (1988). Industrial development bonds
are only exempt if they are tax exempt under § 103 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Over time, the SEC has used its rulemaking authority to tighten its regulation of industrial revenue bonds. Until January 1, 1969, it was the SEC's policy not to object if the issuer
obtained an opinion of its own counsel to the effect that these bonds fell within the language
of § 3(a)(2). Cf. Missouri Atty. Gen. Op., 1954-1971 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) If 70,322
(1956). But the Commission adopted a pair of definitional rules for bonds sold after that
date - Rule 131 under the 1933 Act and Rule 3b-5 under the 1934 Act - in order to
identify the interest in the obligation of the private company as a separate "security" issued
by the company. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.131, 240.3b-5 (1994). Any part of an obligation evidenced by any bond, note, debenture, or other evidence of indebtedness issued by any governmental unit specified in § 3(a)(2) of the 1933 Act or § 3(a)(12) of the 1934 Act and
"payable from payments to be made in respect of property or money which is or will be used,
under a lease, sale, or loan arrangement, by or for industrial or commercial enterprise" is
considered a separate "security" issued by the lessee or obligor. 17 C.F.R. § 230.131 (1994).
Loan and sale as well as lease arrangements are covered in recognition of the fact that essentially the same kind of financing plan could be carried out by a governmental body's lending
the proceeds of the bonds to private enterprise on a deferred payment basis.
202. 3 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note l, at 1162-63. For a discussion of this debate in the
period preceding the WPPSS debacle, see 3 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 1163-70.
Regarding the near default in New York City, see SEC, SUBcoMM. ON EcoN. STABIUZA·
TION OF nm HOUSE CoMM. ON BANKING, FIN. AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 95m CoNo., lST SESS.,
STAFF REPORT ON TRANSAcnONS IN SECURITIES OF nm CrrY OF NEW YORK (Comm. Print
1977), summarized in 3 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 1162-63 n.56. Regarding the
WPPSS, see Staff Report on the Investigation in the Matter of 'Ii'ansactions in Washington
Public Power Supply System Securities, reprinted in part in 1988-1989 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) If 84,327 (1988); Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 1, at 289-95 (Supp. 1994) (summarizing the staff report).
203. Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the Regulation of Municipal
Securities, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) lflf 84,325, 89,436 (Sept. 22,
1988) [hereinafter Report on Regulation of Municipal Securities].
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enue bonds, and at least 82 private purpose (conduit) bond defaults .... Moreover, the Bond Investors Association indicates that,
from 1983 to the first quarter of 1988, over 300 municipal issuers defaulted on their obligations.204

In all, the municipal debt default rate of approximately 0.7% was
nearly equal to the corporate debt default rate of 1.1 %.20s
The SEC and Congress have moved incrementally, but steadily,
in the period after the New York City bond crisis and WPPSS default to expand federal securities regulation. First, in 1975 Congress
enacted section 15B of the Securities Exchange Act to establish jurisdiction over municipal securities dealers, subject to a selfregulatory organization called the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board (MSRB).2 06 Second, in 1990 the SEC approved a rule proposal made by the MSRB to require the mandatory :filing of offering statements by municipal issuers.2 01 Third, the SEC adopted
Rule 15c2-12, which makes it unlawful for any broker, dealer, or
municipal securities dealer to ac~ as underwriter in a primary municipal securities offering with an aggregate offering price of $1 million or more unless (i) before bidding for or buying the securities it
obtained and reviewed an officiai statement that was complete except for certain transaction-related data; (ii) it forwarded copies of
the official statement to any potential customer· on request; (iii) it
obtained final copies of the official statement within seven business
204. Id. 'I 89,436 n.57 (citation omitted).
205. PUBLIC SEC. AssN., MUNICIPAL SECURII1ES DISCLOSURE TASK FORCE REPORT: INITIAL ANALYSIS OF CuRRENr DISCLOSURE PRAcnCES IN nm MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET (1988), cited in Report on Regulation of Municipal Securities, supra note 203, 'I 89,437
n.58.
206. Securities Act Amendments of1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 15B(b)(l), 89 Stat. 97, 132.
See generally 6 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 3086-9:S.
207. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Delivery of Official Statements and Recordkeeping, Exchange Act Release No. 34-28081, 46 SEC Docket (CCH) 563
(June 1, 1990). Tue following year, the SEC approved a further rule change to permit the
MSRB to establish and operate a central electronic facility, the Municipal Securities Information Library, through which information collected pursuant to MSRB Rule G-36 would be
made available electronically to market participants and information vendors. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change of the MSRB Relating to the Proposed Operation of the
Official Statement and Advance Refunding Document, Exchange Act Release No. 34-29298,
49 SEC Docket (CCH) 34, 34 (June 13, 1991). In 1991, Rule G-36 was amended also to
require underwriters to deliver advance refunding documents to the MSRB. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Delivery of Advance Refunding Documents, Exchange Act Release No. 34-29299, 49 SEC Docket (CCH) 50 (June 13, 1991).
In April of 1992, the SEC approved a MSRB proposal to establish and operate the Continuing Disclosure Information Pilot System, which - functioning as part of the Library will "accept and disseminate voluntary submissions of official continuing disclosure documents relating to outstanding issues of municipal securities." Order Approving Proposed
Rule Change of the MSRB Relating to the Proposed Operation of the Continuing Disclosure
Information Pilot System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-30556, 51 SEC Docket (CCH) 231,
232 (Apr. 6, 1992) (emphasis added).
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days after any final agreement to buy or sell the municipal securities; and (iv) it forwarded copies of the final official statement to
any potential customer from the time the final official statement
became available until the earlier of ninety days from the end of the
underwriting period or the time when the official statement was
available to any person from a nationally recognized municipal securities information repository, but in no case less than twenty-five
days after the end of the underwriting period.2os Along with this
rule, the SEC published interpretative commentary emphasizing
the obligation of a municipal underwriter to have a reasonable basis
for recommending any municipal securities and its responsibility in
fulfilling that obligation to review in a professional manner the accuracy of offering statements with which it is associated.209 These
are roughly the same due diligence requirements applicable to corporate issuers under section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act,210
Fourth, in 1993, after a spate of allegations of illegal payoffs and
influence peddling, Congressmen Dingell and Markey requested an
SEC Statement regarding whether the "Tower Amendment" in sections 15Bd(l)-(2) of the 1934 Act211 - prohibiting 1933-Act type
disclosure documents from being filed before a municipal issuance
- should be repealeq in whole or in part.212 An earlier SEC staff
report appeared to sympathize with this proposal.213 Subsequently,
in 1994, the SEC published statements indicating an intent to
208. Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-34961, 57 SEC
Docket (CCH) 2994 (Nov. 17, 1994) (amendments to Rule 15c2-12); Municipal Securities
Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-26985, 43 SEC Docket (CCH) 1880 (June 28, 1989)
(adopted rule); Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-26100, 41
SEC Docket (CCH) 1131 (Sept. 22, 1988) (proposed rule).
209. 43 SEC Docket (CCH) at 1898-900; see also 41 SEC Docket (CCH) at 1148-49.
210. Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988); see supra note 181 and accompanying
text.
211. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, sec. 13, § 15B(d), 89 Stat. 97, 137 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d) (1988)) (amending § 15 of the Exchange Act).
212. Congressmen Ask SEC to Review Municipal Securities Regulation, 25 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 787 (June 4, 1993).
213. The SEC Staff Report on the Municipal Securities Market, [1993 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'I 85,217 (Sept. 15, 1993), while finding that "the municipal market
generally functions in an effective manner," id. 'I 84,333, nonetheless identified "significant
areas where improvements can be made," id. With respect to municipal issuer disclosure, the
report stated:
-Because of the voluntary nature of municipal issuer disclosure, there is a marked
variance in the quality of disclosure, during both the primary offering stage and in the
secondary market. The Staff believes that voluntary efforts to increase disclosure in the
municipal securities market, while constructive, have not resulted in complete and comprehensive disclosure of the financial condition of issuers of municipal securities.
-In the Staff's view, comprehensive improvement of the existing system would require Congressional action. Congress could provide the Commission with specific statutory authority to set disclosure standards for municipal issuers, or even rescind the
exempt status of municipal bonds under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act,
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tighten municipal disclosure requirements further, either through
legislation or through rulemaking.214
Proposals of this type, if adopted, would go far toward applying
a mandatory disclosure system to the municipal securities market.
Underlying this evolution toward greater federal securities regulation has been a notable change in investors of municipal securities.
As a 1993 SEC staff report explained:
The profile of the typical investor in municipal securities also has
changed dramatically over this century. Historically, investors in municipal bonds were institutions and wealthy individuals wishing to
take advantage of the tax-exempt status of fairly low-risk municipal
securities. The interest received by holders of most municipal securities was exempt from federal income taxation, and in some cases,
from state and local income taxation, and thus was very attractive to
taxpayers in higher tax brackets. With the changing income tax rates,
persons of more moderate means increasingly have invested in municipal securities. Today, households are the largest holders of municipal
debt, followed by municipal bond mutual funds, property and casualty
insurers, commercial banks, and money market funds.21s
thereby subjecting them to the registration and continuous reporting obligations applicable to corporate and foreign government bond issuers.
-If Congress chooses not to provide the Commission with full authority to create
comprehensive and complete disclosure in this area, the Commission could explore ways
to improve initial and secondary market disclosure, to the extent possible, under its existing authority.
-The Staff strongly believes, however, that any Commission action in this area
could not fully address existing disclosure problems. Comprehensive improvements to
the existing system would require legislation. At a minimum, the Staff supports acrossthe-board registration of corporate obligations underlying conduit bonds so as to assure
equal regulatory treatment of corporate obligations whether or not such obligations
nominally are issued through a municipal entity.
Id. 'H 84,333-34.
214. In 1994, the SEC published a detailed Statement of the Commission Regarding Disclosure Obligations of Municipal Securities Issuers and Others, Securities Act Release No.
33-7049, 56 SEC Docket (CCH) 479 (Mar. 9, 1994). While praising voluntary disclosure
guidelines issued by the Government Fmance Officers Association and the National Federation of Municipal Analysts, see id. at 484, 491, 493-94, and noting that 46 states currently
require, or are in the process of establishing a requirement, that state government financial
statements be prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP), as determined by the Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB), id. at
486-87, the SEC found that "there continue to be concerns with the adequacy of municipal
offering disclosure, particularly with respect to offerings of non-general obligation bonds and
smaller issues," id. at 482. See generally id. at 482-83.
Accordingly, this interpretative release addressed four topics, including the following:
(2) The Commission is renewing its recommendation for legislation to repeal the
exemption for corporate obligations underlying certain conduit securities from the registration and reporting requirements of the federal securities laws.
(3) Particularly because of their public nature, issuers in the municipal market routinely make public statements and issue reports that can affect the market for their securities; without a mechanism for providing ongoing disclosures to investors, these
disclosures may cause the issuer to violate the antifraud provisions ..•.
Id. at 480.
215. SEC Staff Report, supra note 198, 'i 84,335 (footnotes omitted).
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In essence, just as a growth in individual investor interest in corporate securities may have been the key dynamic in prompting and
sustaining interest in a mandatory disclosure system, similar interest
in tax-exempt municipal securities appears to have fueled a more
recent enthusiasm for greater federal mandatory municipal securities regulation disclosure.
ill. ~,Of'l'CLUSION
Ultimately, the resolution of the boundaries of federal securities
regulation will involve a complex interplay of contextual and political factors. What is clear is that no single dynamic will be decisive
in all applications. The enormous expansion of individual investor
interest in corporate and, more recently, municipal securities may
long check t4e countervailing preserves for erosion of mandatory
standards associated with institutional investor interest and competitive foreign securities markets. Erosion of standards in one area such as the 1933 Act - may well be concomitant with expansion or
cognate standards - such as the periodic mandatory disclosure requirements under the 1934 Act. What does seem probable is that
for the foreseeable future, while change may occur at the margins
of federal securities regulation, the enduring need to remediate information asymmetries will keep core areas of this regulation intact.

